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AN EMPIRE OF LAW?: LEGALISM AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
John M. Czarnetzky*
Ronald j Rychlakt
INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century was the most blood-stained hundred years
in human history,' and the injuries were largely self-inflicted. No
longer were plague, disease, or natural disaster the greatest killers;
rather, governments themselves were all too often transformed from
salutary associations for mutual protection and the promotion of the
common good into instruments of terror, crime, and "administrative
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1 The estimates for deaths in all of the conflicts of the twentieth century top 170
million. See STEPHANE COURTOIS, ET AL., THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM 4 (1999);
R.J. RUMMELL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 3 (1994).
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massacre."2 This led to a widespread call for an international tribunal
to punish the worst perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 3
Though there have been ad hoc tribunals and national prosecutions
of criminals who have committed genocide and other crimes against
2 The phrase "administrative massacre" was coined by Hannah Arendt to de-
scribe state-sponsored mass murder directed against "any given group" wherein the
"principle of selection is dependent only upon circumstantial factors." HANNAH AR-
ENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 288 (Penguin
Books, rev. & enlarged ed. 1977).
3 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 177, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) (resolution proposing an international criminal court); see also The Permanent
International Criminal Court: International Law Association Report of the 34th Conference,
August 5-11, 1926, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PFACE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
252-68 (1980); INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT CENTURY 17-19 (Mark
W. Janis ed., 1992); FARHAD MALEKIAN, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGAL
AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 263-75 (1991); Ass'n Internationale
de Droit P6nal, Symposium, La Creation d'uneJuridiction Pnale Internationale et la Coop-
ration Internationale en Matilre Phnale, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNALE 435
(1974); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Historical Sur-
vey, 149 MIL. L. REV. 49, 49 (1995); M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in
Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS.J. 11, 11 (1997) [hereinafter Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda]; M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the
New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 152-58 (1992); Develop-
ments in the Law-International Criminal Law, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1943, 1947 (2001);
Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and American Con-
cerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 121, 123 (1994); Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International
Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 375, 377 (1992); George A. Finch, Editorial Comment: Draft Statute for an Inter-
national Criminal Court, 46 Am.J. INT'L. L. 89 (1952); Sandra L.Jamison, A Permanent
International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENV.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 419 (1995); Yuen-Li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Na-
tions, 46 AM.J. INT'L L. 73 (1952); Paul D. Ma'quardt, Law Without Borders: The Consti-
tutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 77 (1995);
Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson, A New International Criminal Law Re-
gime?, 42 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 177 (1995); Richard I. Miller, FarBeyond Nuremberg: Steps
Towards an International Criminal Jurisdiction, 61 Ky. L.J. 925, 927 (1973); Vespasien V.
Pella, Plan d'un Code RepressifMondial, 6 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNALE 348
(1935); Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 Am. J. INT'L L.
37, 37 (1950); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal
Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 387 (2000); Michael P. Scharf, Getting
Serious About an International Criminal Court, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 103 (1994); Leila
Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 665, 665 (1996); Quincy Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal
Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 63 (1952).
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humanity,4 the impetus for an International Criminal Court (ICC)
culminated in an unprecedented international "statute, ' 5  the
4 Since World War I, there have been four ad hoc international tribunals and
five international investigatory commissions established. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Histori-
cal Survey: 1919-1998, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 5 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998) [hereinafter ICC DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY]. The four tribunals are: (1) the International Military Tribunal at Nu-
remberg, (2) the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, (3) the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the Hague, and (4) the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at Arusha. Id. at 5-6. The investigatory
commissions are: (1) the 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of
War and on Enforcement of Penalties (investigating atrocities committed during
World War I), (2) the 1943 United Nations War Crime Commission (investigating
German war crimes during World War II), (3) the 1946 Far Eastern Commission (in-
vestigatingJapanese war crimes during World War II), (4) the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (investigating violations of
human fights in the former Yugoslavia), and (5) the Independent Commission of
Experts established in accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (investigating
violations of human rights in Rwanda). Id. at 5-6. Interestingly, the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, ending World War I, provided for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II of
Germany for offenses "against international morality," and for the prosecution of
other persons for acts against the law of war, but no international tribunals were ever
created. Id. at 7.
5 The concept of an international "statute," as distinguished from an interna-
tional "treaty," is an unprecedented and recent development in international law. See
American Bar Ass'n Task Force on an Int'l Criminal Court & N.Y. State Bar Associa-
tion, Joint Report with Recommendations to the House of Delegates: Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, 27 INT'L LAw. 257, 257 (1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. Task
Force]; James H. Carter, Report on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations in
Advancing the Rule of Law in the World, Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness of the
United Nations (1994), 29 INT'L LAw. 293, 300 (1995); Timothy L. Dickinson, Joint
Report with Recommendations to the House of Delegates: Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. 118B (tracing procedural history of
the International Criminal Court); RonaldJ. Rychlak &John M. Czarnetzky, The Inter-
national Criminal Court and the Question of Subsidiarity, 2000-2003 THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUD. 115, 119 (2003). Ambassador DavidJ. Scheffer, the head of the United States
delegation to the ICC negotiations, has noted:
When one speaks of creating a court on an international level, it has to have
some governing document for the functioning of that court. And as with the
Yugoslav Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal, the Security Council adopted
statutes or a statute for each tribunal, which is its constitution, basically, the
court's own constitution, the basic principles by which the court must
function.
It is simply a term of art that has arisen in the international sphere, and
during the talks for the ICC, it is that basic constitutional document of the
court itself which is described as the statute. The treaty itself, when ratified,
embodies that statute, and I guess the best I can say is that it's simply, in U.N.
practice, once you have ratified the treaty, per se, you are also, of course,
adopting as part of that ratification package, the statute of the court itself.
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1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome
Statute) .6
The Rome Statute attempts, through the ICC, to use notions of
criminal law to punish gross violations of international human rights
norms. The ICC is an international court with jurisdiction over grave
international "crimes" as defined by the Rome Statute. 7 Its jurisdic-
tion is defined in the Rome Statute as "complementary" to that of
individual nations.8 If the individual nation is either unable or unwill-
ing to prosecute malefactors who have committed crimes within the
Rome Statute, then the ICC's prosecutor must prosecute.9 Moreover,
the Rome Statute provides that amnesties provided by the nation con-
cerned are not binding on the ICC.10 The idea behind the ICC is that
the international community must end the impunity with which horri-
ble human rights violations have been perpetrated and, if such impu-
nity cannot be deterred effectively in every instance, it must always be
punished.
In this Article, we examine the underlying assumptions support-
ing this jurisdictional scheme to discern whether it might not, in cer-
tain circumstances, do more harm than good, and whether its actions
might even result in social discord and armed strife rather than
peace. 1 These concerns are particularly acute in the very instances
The International Criminal Court: Hearings Before the House Comm. On Int'l Relations,
106th Cong. 46-47 (2000) (statement of Ambassador Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep't of State); see also Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341, 8 I.L.M. 679, 693 (1969)
(agreeing that no state can be held to the provisions of a treaty that it has not
ratified).
6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at http://
www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
7 For a full discussion of the jurisdictional scheme of the ICC, see infra Part II.B.
8 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5, 37 I.L.M at 1003.
9 Id. art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 1003.
10 Id.
11 One of the major justifications for international prosecution of human rights
violations is that permitting perpetrators of such crimes to escape without punish-
ment is a threat to peace. See id. pmbl., 37 I.L.M. at 1002 ("Recognizing that such
grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.") (emphasis
removed); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and AchievingJustice: The Need
for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1996, at 9, 26 (1996) (arguing
that impunity is "counterproductive to the ultimate goal of peace"); W. Michael Reis-
man, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public Order, 6 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 175, 178 (1995) (identifying the restoration of public order as a
significant goal of sanctions).
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where the ICC is most likely to have its greatest utility-where a soci-
ety is in, or just emerging from, a major transition. 12
The idea of an international court with jurisdiction during or af-
ter a political revolution is not necessarily inherently misguided or
dangerous; however, there is a fundamental flaw in the ICC which we
believe will cause the court, as it is currently structured, to become
either irrelevant or dangerous. That fundamental flaw is the lack of
any moral and political check as part of the ICC's structure. 13
When it comes to tyrants who have visited serious human rights
violations upon their fellow citizens, criminal prosecution may well be
the mostjust course of action.1 4 An international tribunal would have
12 The Rome Statute's delineation of the ICC's jurisdiction virtually ensures that
the ICC will prosecute cases only where a nation is undergoing, or has emerged from,
some sort of political revolution. After all, if a tyrant committing human rights abuses
is in control of a nation, even if that nation is already a member of the ICC and its
governing body-the Assembly of States Parties-it is highly unlikely that the leader
will be surrendered to the ICC for prosecution. The only chance for a trial before the
ICC is a revolutionary change in the nature of that nation's government. The subject
of transitional justice truly has captured the scholarly imagination, to judge from the
effusion of writing on the topic. See, e.g., RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 215
(2000) (noting that transitional justice must "somehow bridge conventional legality
and the normative shift entailed by liberalizing transformation"). See generally TRANsI-
TIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAw IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (A. James McAdams ed.,
1997); 1-3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter TRANSITIONALJUSTICE]; Antonio F. Pe-
rez, The Perils of Pinochet: Problems for Transitional Justice and a Supranational Governance
Solution, 28 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175 (2000); Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies,
Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707 (1999).
13 Many of the delegations involved in negotiating the ICC stated that the lack of
a political process as part of the court's structure was one of the inherent strengths of
the ICC, a position that we believe is simply wrong. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
577 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE] (calling
for greater independence from political influence of the U.N. Security Council
(statement of Benin)); id. at 587 (lauding prosecutor's independence from "political
developments" (statement of Croatia)); id. at 592 (stating that it "would have pre-
ferred the Court to be independent of any political body...." (statement of Egypt));
id. at 598 (calling it an advantage that the ICC structure eliminates "the need for a
decision of the Security Council in order to establish an ad hoc tribunal" (statement
of Hungary)); id. at 603 (citing as an achievement of the Rome Statute that recourse
to the court is not limited to states, but rather may be brought by the prosecutor at his
or her own discretion (statement of Italy)); id. at 611 (lauding court as independent
of international political process (statement of New Zealand)).
14 Too often, political decisions, such as the decision to prosecute, are influenced
by factors that denyjustice. Thus, there is the constant fear that laws are not equally
applied, or that the rich and powerful are not treated the same way that others are
treated. Such fears propel drives for strict, mechanistic application of legalistic for-
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an important role in cases where the society in question is incapable
of conducting the investigation and trial of the crimes. In other tran-
sitional societies, however, the establishment or reestablishment of a
stable polity may require attention to not just what is due to victims of
human rights crimes, but also the overarching common good of the
society. In particular, the calculus of justice in these societies will re-
quire a delicate balance between retribution and punishment for ter-
rible crimes on one side, and peace and order on the other. Justice in
such a context requires close attention to political and moral bonds
among citizens and groups of citizens within the polity, sometimes
known for lack of a better term as civic "friendship" or "concord.' 15
In such situations, it is the practical reason of the legitimate represent-
atives of the polity applied to the question of the common good on a
case-by-case basis (i.e., morality-influenced politics)1 6-not mechanis-
tic legalism-that will provide the path to justice. 17
mulas. A current example can be found in sentencing guidelines, which were origi-
nally suggested as a means of assuring equal treatment for all criminal defendants. Of
course, manyjudges feel that the guidelines have harmed the cause ofjustice by strip-
ping them of their discretion. See generally KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). The same is true of
so-called "three-strikes" legislation. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISH-
MENT AND DEMOCRACY. THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001).
15 We employ the term "friendship" in the manner of Aristotle, who distin-
guished different types of friendship depending upon the nature of the association
shared by human beings. Aristotle believed that while very few "true" friendships-
something akin to "love" in modern parlance-are possible, in every human associa-
tion and interaction there are bonds of friendship based in part on human beings'
natural empathy for one another counterbalanced by the individual instrumental
concerns of the people involved. Indeed, Aristotle believed that such friendship ex-
ists even in the most instrumental of human interactions-parties to a contract. See
infra notes 161-63.
16 Aquinas defined law as "a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler
who governs a perfect community." 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in BASic
WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 748 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945). He realized that
the ruler might not always properly apply "practical reason" to a given situation, 2 id.
at 743-44, but he at least recognized its importance. Aquinas argued that in such case
the rulers will reflect not the force of law, but "the sovereign's will would savor of
lawlessness rather than of law." 2 id. at 744. It is this practical reason, based on moral
considerations and sometimes on political compromise, that can lead to the common
good in difficult situations, despite the risk that it may be abused in other cases.
17 Criminal law in a stable nation with an established rule of law is one of many
tools for fostering the common good of the nation, its communities, and its citizens,
just as the establishment and enforcement of human fights norms is an extremely
important aspect of any notion of an international common good. However, the jus-
tice that flows from courts and criminal trials comes at a price-absolute adherence
to pre-established norms. That alternative precludes the use of political considera-
tions. In an established community dedicated to the rule of law, this is not a major
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The ICC as an institution is the result of absolute faith in a
nonpolitical, legalistic model of justice: where human rights violations
have occurred, prosecutions must take place either on the national
level or in the ICC. The ICC is, therefore, the apotheosis of "legal-
ism"-the late political philosopher Judith Shklar's term for the ideol-
ogy grounded in the "ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a
matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties
and rights determined by rules."' 8
For legalists, the courts of law and trials are "the social paradigms,
the perfection, the very epitome, of legalistic morality."'19 Zealous le-
galists, particularly lawyers, judges, and legal academics, take the pri-
macy of legalism as a philosophy for granted. Law, in this view, is
inherently and morally superior to the sordid compromises and
squabbles of political and social intercourse.20 Rather than an instru-
ment of politics, law is viewed as a distinct science, "sealed off from
general social history, from general social theory, from politics, and
from morality."'2 1 The purpose of legal philosophy and scholarship on
problem. Enforcement of criminal law manifestly serves the common good of the
community, and thus there is little need to weigh political considerations. (This is
not to say that such reasoning is impossible, even in local criminal prosecutions. For
example, many prosecutors in the United States are elected officials, and thus subject
to a significant political check on their duties.) In the few instances where the crimi-
nal law ought to bend to greater considerations ofjustice, there are safety valves such
as prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and reduced sentences for cooperation
with authorities.
18 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAw, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1986).
See F.C. DeCoste, Faith: Political Philosophy in the Canadian Academy, 39 ALBERTA L. REV.
738, 752 (2001) (reviewing CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY REFLEC-
TIONS (Ronald Beiner & Wayne Norman eds., 2001)).
19 See SHKL.AR, supra note 18, at 1-2; David Ray Papke, The American Courtroom
Trial: Pop Culture, Courthouse Realities, and the Dream World ofJustice, 40 S. TEX. L. REv.
919, 932 n.60 (1999); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAwYERs: How
THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETV 221 (1994)
(noting critically "an increase in the demand for judicial services" and quoting Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 761, 771 (1987)); id. at 275 (blaming "legal opinion leaders" for "peddling an
idea of law that promised too much").
20 The basis of this theory seems to be reflected in de Tocqueville's observation,
"The spirit of the law, born within schools and courts, spreads little by little beyond
them; it infiltrates through society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally the whole
people have contracted some of the ways and tastes of a magistrate." ALEXIS DE TOG
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Laurence trans.,
Anchor Books 1969) (1840).
21 SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 2; Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism,
19 CARDozo L. REv. 1393, 1413 (1998); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of
Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. RE\v. 1133, 1185 (1992).
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this view solely is to define what is and what is not law, with the goal of
exactly defining the boundary between law and politics. Once that
boundary is established, 'justice" consists of the mechanical, zealous
enforcement of the law through the judicial system. Thus elevated
above politics, nothing short of an empire of law is established.
We believe that what sparks faith in the ICC, a faith that is held
quite strongly in Western intellectual circles, is the dream that such an
empire, ruled by law and not fallible human judgment, will largely
eradicate the problem of impunity in international affairs through de-
terrence, 22 and that violations of human rights will become an abnor-
mality. Current political institutions have not stopped human rights
violations of the worst sort, so the problem must be with those politi-
cal institutions. The ICC is thus an attempt to transcend political in-
stitutions, both at the national and the international level, and
enthrone law and its institutions as the governing authority of the
world.
This isolation and elevation of mechanistic law above moral polit-
ics in the international arena is a fundamental mistake with poten-
tially grave consequences. Law is a form of social action that is a
subset of, not superior to, moral politics. 23 The efforts of the past half
century to deal with violations of human rights have culminated in a
classic legalist solution-an international criminal court divorced al-
most entirely from moral politics and purposely insulated from any
outside influence, political or otherwise. This elevation ofjudicial law
precludes the possibility of non-legalistic, political modes of thought
22 The National Legal Center for the Public Interest released a monolith on the
subject, David Davenport, The New International Criminal Court: Rush to Justice?
(2002), noting that "a chief objective in creating the International Criminal Court is
to deter crime." Id. at 30. Davenport goes on to note that by making war and reprisal
more civilized, the ICC may actually decrease the likelihood that criminal activity will
be deterred. Id.; see also Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective
Means of Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156, 188 (2001) (commenting that an offender
has "about as much chance of being prosecuted as 'winning the lottery'").
23 See SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 8:
As a social ethos which gives rise to the political climate in which judicial and
other legal institutions flourish, legalism is beyond reproach. It is the rigid-
ity of legalistic categories of thought, especially in appraising the relation-
ships of law to the political environment within which it functions, that is so
deleterious. This is . . . what prevents its exponents from recognizing both
the strengths and weaknesses of law and legal procedures in a complex so-
cial world.
Id.; see alsoJuDITH N. SHKIAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 17 (1990) (discussing the faith
of adherents to legalism and a "normal model ofjustice" that with the proper institu-
tional arrangements, injustices will be rare).
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and action concerning justice and morality. In many situations, this
exclusive reliance on legalistic justice, and the concomitant refusal to
recognize any alternate path to justice, will lead to injustice in the form
of renewed political turmoil and its ultimate extension, war. The goal
of this Article is to show that this faith in legalism in the ICC is mis-
placed and self-defeating, and to suggest ways in which that structure
may be altered to reflect the court's proper place as part of an effec-
tive international political order.
In Part I of this Article, we explore the traditional political re-
sponses to behavior that constitutes a crime under the Rome Statute,
including examples from Nazi Germany, Chile, and South Africa. In
Part II, we explain the limits of legalism as applied to international
affairs, through a discussion of the proper understanding of the role
and application of human rights principles, especially in political tran-
sitions. In Part III, we delineate flaws in the Rome Statute which
might render a legal institution nobly intended to ensure the peace
an ignoble instrument of international discord. We also suggest in
Part IV ways in which the ICC or some other international criminal
court might be structured more carefully to accomplish the lofty goals
set for it.24 We conclude with some thoughts about the human strug-
gle for justice, and the path we must take to achieve an enduring
peace.
I. TRADITIONAL RESPONSES
History reveals four traditional responses to the fall of a regime
that has been guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity. 25 The
first is physical revenge carried out by the victors, which may lead to
bloody cycles of revenge and reprisal. 26 In such cases, the lack of any
formal mechanism can lead individuals to exact 'justice" by their own
24 We do not intend to infer that the ICC will not survive, though we believe that
if it is to thrive, its jurisdictional provisions must be modified. In this regard, we are
mindful that failed political institutions are often the seeds for stronger ones. Obvi-
ous examples include the Articles of Confederacy preceding the United States Consti-
tution and the League of Nations preceding the United Nations.
25 See HELENA COBBAN, THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF WORLD PEACE: NOBEL LAU-
REATES Discuss OUR GLOBAL FUTURE 135 (2000) (summarizing the remarks of Arch-
bishop Desmond Tutu at a conference of Nobel laureates at the University of
Virginia).
26 Archbishop Tutu well described this "almost atavistic" impulse toward victors'
revenge: "You clobbered me, I am waiting for my chance to clobber you back. That's
exactly what happened in Rwanda. The Hutu did something to the Tutsi. The Tutsi
disappeared for thirty years. They came back, and we had genocide .... Now, that's
one way." Id.
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hands, and by their own lights, with predictably disastrous results.
The histories of Rwanda and Bosnia teach that old wounds do not
heal by themselves; they require the balm of justice. What form jus-
tice takes, and how it is to be gauged, is, of course, the rub.
A second historic response to an overthrown tyranny is the legalis-
tic solution of courtroom trials conducted by judges appointed by the
victors or some outside tribunal (such as a military tribunal).27 The
Nuremberg trials following World War II represent the most well
known example of this approach. The victorious Allies established a
court and procedures for dealing with, and disposing of, the surviving
high-level Nazis. Given that Germany's legal system was decimated,
the tyrants were fully defeated, and the Allies were willing and able to
conduct fair trials, this model seems to have worked well in that partic-
ular circumstance.
A third historic approach to a transitional society is the purely
political response in which a settlement is reached that includes guar-
anties such as amnesties that serve to preempt subsequent prosecu-
tions. From several recent examples, we have chosen to examine
Chile. Particularly interesting is that the saga of Chile's transition to
democracy did not end, at least for much of the world, with the settle-
ment worked out in the country.
A fourth and rather new approach is the "mixed" legalistic and
political approach of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This
has been tried in many transitional societies, but its most notable suc-
cess has been in South Africa, where a commission has helped that
nation move to democracy from apartheid while avoiding civil war.
28
A. The Legalistic Model: The Example of Nuremberg
Even before World War II ended, people started talking about
putting war criminals, including Adolf Hitler and his close associates,
on trial for war crimes. 29 Despite the risk that it might be seen as the
victors taking vengeance on defeated nations, 30 there was a sense that
27 See id.
28 See infra Part I.C.
29 See, e.g., MICHAEL YOUNG, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF HITLER 144 (1944) (reflecting in
part fact and part fiction, the wish of many people in the Allied nations). Hitler's
suicide, however, prevented that trial. For a full historical discussion, see Herman von
Hebel, An International Criminal Court-A Historical Perspective, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 13 (Herman A.M von Hebel et al. eds., 1999).
30 See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROBS. 263 (1950), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 3 (Gerhard
OW. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds., 1965).
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justice had to be served. 3' In January 1943, President Roosevelt,
Prime Minister Churchill, and Charles de Gaulle concluded a ten-day
meeting in Casablanca. From this meeting came the Allied demand
for unconditional surrender.32 That demand set the tone that led in-
evitably toward the Nuremberg trials.
At the Moscow Conference in November 1943, in what was to be-
come known as the Moscow Declaration, the United States, Great Brit-
ain, and the Soviet Union agreed that "the major criminals whose
offenses have no particular location ... will be punished by a joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies."3 3 How they would be pun-
ished was, however, not clear. The United States and France were in
favor of the creation of an international criminal tribunal, wherein
not only a trial could be held, but where history could be recorded,
the world educated, and deterrence served. The Soviet Union, tradi-
tionally appreciative of political show trials, did not object, but also
favored summary executions. Great Britain, fearing a trial would be-
come a forum of Nazi propaganda and self-justification, also favored
summary, but not mass, executions. 34 Ultimately, the United States
was influential in the decision to conduct legitimate trials.35
31 See Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Tria4 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 30, at 239.
32 Some have argued that once Germany was losing the war, the main obstacle to
peace was this self-imposed barrier. B.H. LIDDELL HART, HISTORY OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 681 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1971) (1970). The German Ambassador to the
Holy See later reported: "I told every official quarter in Rome to which I had access
that this formula would cost the lives of many more Allied soldiers." ERNST VON WEIZ-
SACKER, MEMOIRS OF ERNST VON WEIZSACKER 297 (John Andrews trans., 1951). In Feb-
ruary 1945, General Eisenhower noted: "The policy [of unconditional surrender]
faced the German high command with the choice of being hanged or jumping into a
clump of bayonets...." TREVOR N. DuPuy & R. ERNEST DuPuY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MILITARY HISTORY 1016 (1970). In fairness to the Allied leaders, however, it should be
noted that a conditional surrender had not held up after World War I.
33 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEM-
OIR 27 (1992).
34 Id. at 30; see also Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 3, at 24. Under
Churchill's plan, an initial list of fifty to one hundred of the "Hitler and Mussolini
gangs and the Japanese war lords" was to be created. Once a person on the list was
caught, a short field tribunal to ascertain identity would be convened, and once estab-
lished, execution would follow within hours. ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREM-
BERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT 73 (1998).
35 Chief Prosecutor Jackson explained: "The record on which we judge these de-
fendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these
defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well." Robert H. Jackson,
Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945), in 2
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
101 (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS]; see also BRADLEY F.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Allies met to negotiate procedures for the post-war trial fol-
lowing the signing of the charter of the United Nations (June 26,
1945). The final agreement, known as the London Agreement, was
signed on August 8, 1945.36 The procedures under which the tribu-
nals would operate were set forth in the Nuremberg Charter, which
was annexed to the London Agreement.37 Although President Tru-
SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 20-45 (1977). The accused were, in Jack-
son's words, "given the kind of a Trial which they, in the days of their pomp and
power, never gave to any man." 19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra, at 399.
In November 1943, Stalin called for at least 50,000 of the German general staff to
be summarily executed. Churchill responded, "I would rather be taken out into the
garden here and now and be shot myself than sully my own and my country's honor
with such infamy." 5 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 330 (1952);
KocHAvi, supra note 34, at 63; see also TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 30. In early 1945,
however, the British leader sent a note to Supreme CourtJustice RobertJackson (who
would become the chief U.S. prosecutor in the war crimes trials), urging execution
without trial for Hider and a number of his associates, including Mussolini. The
Americans would not agree, and German leaders would later stand trial for their war
crimes.
36 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London
Agreement]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. A number of other States
subsequently adhered to the London Agreement, including: Australia, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela
and Yugoslavia. The Nuremberg Trials were followed by the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) and the Allied prosecutions in their respective
zones of occupations. The IMTFE is generally considered an example of how not to
conduct an international criminal tribunal. Rather than a fair judicial inquest, it was
a political animal created not by treaty, but by an order of General MacArthur in his
capacity as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and conducted as such. Bas-
siouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 3, at 32. The IMTFE was dominated by
American judges, prosecutors, and attorneys. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD OR-
DER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOOK 170 (Burns H. Weston et al. eds., 2d ed.
1990); M. Cherif. Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity"* The Need for a Specialized Con-
vention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 463 (1994).
In addition to the Nuremberg Trials, the Allies undertook prosecutions in their
respective zones of occupation. See KoCHAvi, supra note 34, at 168; James T. Brand,
Crimes Against Humanity and the Niirnberg Trials, 28 OR. L. REV. 93, 100 (1949) (citing 1
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 11 (1947)).
37 Attached to the London Agreement was the Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal (IMT), also known as the Nuremberg Charter, which contained the laws
under which such Tribunal would operate. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 36.
Taken together, these documents established several new standards with regard to
international criminal tribunals. The Charter's use and definition of "Crimes Against
Humanity" was derived from earlier documents, The Martens Preamble, the 1915 De-
nunciation, and the 1919 Commission's report regarding the Armenian massacre,
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man may have been incorrect in calling Nuremberg "the First Interna-
tional Criminal Assize in History, '13 8 it was the first time in recorded
history that the architects of a war were put on trial by an interna-
tional body for their acts.39
The Nazi leaders had seized power by suspending guarantees of
freedom and arresting political opponents to gain control of the legis-
lature. 40 They consolidated their power by reducing the power of lo-
cal and regional governments; securing control of the civil service;
controlling the judiciary; and persecuting and murdering their oppo-
nents.41 They also used terror most effectively. 42 All of these crimes
called for criminal prosecution.
TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 13, 27, but it codified for the first time a nexus between
crimes against humanity and war. The Charter also codified the 1919 Commission's
rejection of immunity for heads of state. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 36, art. 7, 59
Stat. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. It also rejected the so-called "superior orders" de-
fense wherein a soldier could claim innocence based upon his orders, though exis-
tence of such orders could be considered for mitigation of sentences. Id. art. 8, 59
Stat. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. The Nuremberg Charter rests on the principle that
"individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual state." 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 35, at 223. This was important, as many defendants at Nuremberg wanted
to assert such a claim as a defense. The Nuremberg Charter also introduced into
international criminal law the concepts of conspiracy and culpability based upon
membership of organizations. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 36, arts. 6, 9, 59
Stat. at 147-48, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286-88, 290.
38 President Harry S. Truman chose this phrase to describe the Nuremberg trial.
SeeJonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and its Limitations, 93 COLUM.
L. REv. 2022, 2025 (1993) (reviewing TAYLOR, supra note 33, and citing FROM NUREM-
BERG TO MY LAI (Jay W. Baird ed., 1972)).
39 The 1919 Commission of World War I was formed to investigate allegations of
war crimes and atrocities, though no prosecutions ever took place. After World War I,
the Kellog-Briand Pact outlawing war had been signed, leading Justice Jackson to
question "what statesman ... could doubt, from 1928 onwards, that aggressive war...
was unlawful and outlawed?" See Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War
Criminals and International Law, 43 Am.J. INT'L L. 223, 232 (1949) (quoting 3 TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 103). For historical surveys and collec-
tions of documents, see 2 FERENCZ, supra note 3 passim; Bassiouni, From Versailles to
Rwanda, supra note 3 passim; and Wexler, supra note 3, at 669-85.
40 See RONALDJ. RYCHLAK, HITLER, THE WAR, AND THE POPE 50-51 (2000); 2 Wit-
LIAM L. SHIRER, 20TH CENTURYJOURNEY, THE NIGHTMARE YEARS 1930-1940, at 116-17
(1984); WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF
NAzI GERMANY 194, 196 (1960).
41 JOHN TOLAND, ADOLF HITLER 259-521 (1976) (detailing the Nazi rise to
power). The Nuremberg Tribunal observed:
The Hitler Cabinet was anxious to pass an "Enabling Act" that would give
them full legislative powers, including the power to deviate from the Consti-
tution. They were without the necessary majority in the Reichstag to be able
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Nuremberg Tribunal was empowered, inter alia, to punish
persons who, while acting in the interests of the European Axis coun-
tries, had committed crimes against peace, 43 including: planning, pre-
to do this constitutionally. They therefore made use of the decree sus-
pending the guarantees of freedom and took into so-called "protective cus-
tody" a large number of Communist deputies and Party officials. Having
done this, Hitler introduced the "Enabling Act" into the Reichstag, and after
he had made it clear that if it was not passed, further forceful measures
would be taken, the act was passed on 24 March 1933.
1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 178. The Tribunal also
stated: "In order to place the complete control of the machinery of Government in
the hands of the Nazi leaders, a series of laws and decrees were passed which reduced
the powers of regional and local governments throughout Germany, transforming
them into subordinate divisions of the Government of the Reich." Id.
42 See generally ALAN BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY (rev. ed. 1962); GUN-
THER DESCHNER, WARSAW RISING (1972); CHARLES BRACELEN FLOOD, HITLER: THE PATH
TO POWER (1989); MARTIN GILBERT, AUSCHWITZ AND THE ALLIES (1981); MARTIN GIL-
BERT, THE HOLOCAUST: A HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF EUROPE DURING THE SECOND WORLD
WAR (1985); MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY
(1989); JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1989); HENRI DE LUBAC, CHRISTIAN
RESISTANCE TO ANTI-SEMITISM: MEMORIES FROM 1940-1944 (1990); JOHN LUKACS, THE
HITLER OF HISTORY (1997); POPE PIUS XI, ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1937); ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH
(1970); WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND POPE PIUS XII
(Myron C. Taylor ed., 1947).
43 Count one of the indictment addressed the nature and development of the
common plan or conspiracy to commit, inter alia, crimes against peace. Count one
began with a general discussion of the rise of the Nazi Party, its central role in the
common plan or conspiracy, its aims and objectives, and the techniques and methods
that it used to advance the common plan or conspiracy, including the acquisition of
totalitarian control of Germany and the economic planning and mobilization for ag-
gressive war. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 27, 29. Count
one also addressed the defendants' use of Nazi control of the German Government
for foreign aggression by pursuing their plan of re-arming, re-occupying, and fortify-
ing the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles as well as other treaties, and
thereby acquiring military strength and political bargaining power against other na-
tions. 1 id. at 35.
Count two contained charges relating to crimes against peace. It alleged that all
of the defendants had participated in planning, preparing, initiating, and waging wars
of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements,
and assurances, initiated against the following twelve countries on the dates indicated:
Poland (1939); the United Kingdom and France (1939); Denmark and Norway
(1940); Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (1940); Yugoslavia and Greece
(1941); the Soviet Union (1941); and the United States (1941). 1 id. at 42.
Counts three and four contained the charges relating to war crimes and crimes
against humanity, respectively. I id. at 42-68. The indictment was submitted to the
Nuremberg Tribunal on October 18, 1945. 1 id. at 171. The Nuremberg Tribunal
made the following observations concerning the charges relating to crimes against
peace:
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paring, initiating or waging a war of aggression, waging war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or partic-
ipating in a common plan or conspiracy to accomplish any of the
above. 44 In addition to a conspiracy or "common plan" count, there
were three basic counts in the indictment: crimes against peace (ag-
gressive war) ,4 5 crimes against the laws of war (war crimes) ,46 and
crimes against humanity (murder and injury to civilians for racial, re-
ligious, or political reasons) . 4 7
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged ag-
gressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil
thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States alone, but
affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.
1 id. at 186.
44 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter provided as follows:
Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article
1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the Eu-
ropean Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who,
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals
or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing ....
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 36, art. 6(a), 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284,
286-88.
45 The crimes against peace count was based on the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of
1928, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, and on Germany's vio-
lation of the many treaties that committed her to the peacful resolution of her dis-
putes with her neighboring states. Invasions such as those of Czechoslovakia and
Austria, were not found to be crimes against peace on the ground that they were acts
of aggression and not wars of aggression. Ehard, supra note 39, at 232.
46 The war crimes and crimes against humanity counts at Nuremberg were the
forerunners of the United Nations Security Council resolution of May 25, 1993, which
provides the basis for the international tribunals that laid the groundwork for the
ICC.
47 According to the Nuremberg Charter, and the holding of the International
Military Tribunal, in order to be actionable, crimes against humanity (murder, en-
slavement, etc. of civilians for political, religious, or racial reasons) had to be carried
out "in execution of or in connection with" another crime within the jurisdiction of
the tribunal. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 36, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82
U.N.T.S. at 288, What this meant was that the pre-war persecution of the Jews in Nazi
Germany was not actionable because it was not connected with a war crime or crime
against peace.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, on leave
to serve as the American Chief Prosecutor,48 in his opening statement
(which has been called "perhaps the greatest forensic speech in the
English language"49 ), addressed the quadripartite International Mili-
tary Tribunal (IMT), saying: "The wrongs which we seek to condemn
and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating,
that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot
survive their being repeated."50 The IMT itself made the following
observations concerning the global impact of Nazi crimes against
peace:
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and
waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is es-
sentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the bel-
ligerent States alone, but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other
48 Robert H. Jackson was appointed Chief Counsel for war crimes by President
Truman on April 26, 1945. TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 45. Previous to this appoint-
ment, Jackson had served as Assistant Attorney General, Solicitor General, Attorney
General, and finally, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 43.
Several weeks before accepting the Chief Counsel position, Justice Jackson publicly
stated his belief that the waging of aggressive war should be criminalized, but also said
that if any trials of Nazi war criminals were to be held, the four powers must be pre-
pared to release any defendants who were acquitted. Robert H. Jackson, Address to
the American Society of International Law on the Topic "The Rule of Law Among
Nations" (Apr. 13, 1945), in TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 44-45. For a detailed presenta-
tion of the prosecutors' experiences at Nuremberg, see Judgments on Nuremberg: The
Past Half Century and Beyond-A Panel Discussion of Nuremberg Prosecutors, 16 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 193, 193 (1996) [herinafter Judgments on Nuremberg].
49 Judgments on Nuremberg, supra note 48, at 195.
50 Robert H. Jackson, supra note 35, at 99; see also I DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE
THE NUREMBERG TRiAL: A PROSECUTOR'S COMPREHENSIVE AccouNT 152 (1999); THE
NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1990). Prosecutor Jackson also commented in his opening statement on how
remarkable it was for the Allies to have put this tribunal together so soon after the
war:
[L]ess than eight months ago today the courtroom in which you sit was an
enemy fortress in the hands of German SS troops. Less than eight months
ago nearly all our witnesses and documents were in the enemy hands. The
law had not been codified, no procedures had been established, no Tribunal
was in existence, no usable courthouse stood here, none of the hundreds of
tons of official German documents had been examined, no prosecuting staff
had been assembled, nearly all of the present defendants were at large, and
the four prosecuting powers had not yet joined in common cause to try
them.
Robert H. Jackson, supra note 35, at 100.
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war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole. 51
The criminal trial model was particularly appropriate in this
case. 52 The Nazis had been defeated by an outside force-the Allies.
This was not the case of an actual or potential civil war, nor did it
involve a negotiated transfer of power from one regime to another.
With their call for unconditional surrender, the Allies had taken any
chance for negotiations off the table at least two years earlier. As
such, there was no reason to try for a political solution at this time. 53
Moreover, Adolf Hitler and Josef G6bbels escaped justice by commit-
ting suicide,54 but the Nazis had been defeated, and the surviving Nazi
leaders (with a few notable exceptions)5 5 were captured and impris-
oned. Accordingly, there was no difficulty in getting the defendants
to court. Moreover, as the world became aware of the Nazi atrocities,
there was no call (or true justification) for across-the-board amnesty
for these defendants. In fact, failure to punish those found guilty
might well have resulted in open and severe acts of retaliation. 56 As
such, criminal prosecution was a very logical option. It was also well-
executed.
51 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 186. The choice of
Nuremberg for the site of these trials was mandated somewhat by the fact that its
courthouse was one of the few remaining in Germany large enough to accommodate
such proceedings. As Jackson's comments suggest, however, it is ironic that we today
equate Nuremberg with constructive limitations on sovereignty designed to create an
assured peace. Less than a decade prior to the proceedings, Nuremberg was the site
of the annual Nazi Party Day rallies where Adolf Hitler whipped his followers into
nationalistic frenzies. It was also from there that many of the most severe racial laws
in Nazi Germany were announced. At that time, Nuremberg symbolized nationalism
run amok. See RYcHLAK, supra note 40, at 77-78.
52 The popularity of this approach to the problem was reflected in some polls at
the time showing that almost two-thirds of the respondents were willing to support the
abstract principle of a world body to settle disputes between states, with the ability to
enforce its decisions. DAVID W. ZIEGLER, WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
133 (1987).
53 Hitler revealed himself as an untrustworthy partner in negotiations prior to the
war. See RYCHLAK, supra note 40, at 119-20.
54 Hermann G6ring stood trial, but on October 15, 1946, two hours before his
scheduled execution, he committed suicide in his Nuremberg cell. JOHN KEEGAN,
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 590 (1990).
55 Adolf Eichmann and Dr. Josef Mengele are the most notorious Nazis who
avoided the Nuremberg Trials. Eichmann was later captured, tried and executed, but
Mengele lived out his life under an assumed name without ever facing justice.
RYCHLACK, supra note 40, at 423 nn.187-88.
56 See, e.g., JOHN SACK, AN EYE FOR AN EE (1993).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Nuremberg established a legacy of fairness and due process in
international tribunals. 57  Twenty-four defendants were indicted,
twenty-two were prosecuted, 58 three were acquitted, twelve were sen-
tenced to death, three to life, and the remaining to various imprison-
ment terms from ten to twenty years. 59 The acquittals and sentences
to punishments other than death suggest that this was not a situation
of "victor's justice. 6 0
Nuremberg also made three historic contributions to interna-
tional legal history. The first was to create an indisputable historical
record of the Nazi regime's atrocities and conduct during World War
II, beginning with planned acts of aggression, including the Holo-
caust. The second contribution was establishing that any person
could be held personally responsible for crimes; he cannot shield him-
self under an act of state doctrine. 61 Third, and perhaps most impor-
57 This is not to say that defendants were given all of the rights that a modern
criminal defendant in the United States might expect. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to
Rwanda, supra note 3, at 29 (noting the denial of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion rights in some cases). Although there was no appeal process, a clemency review
process was available. Bush, supra note 38, at 2081.
58 In one case the defendant was deemed too old and unhealthy to face trial. In
another case, it was determined that the wrong person had been indicted.
59 The twenty-two defendants who appeared before the Tribunal (and their
sentences or the disposition of their cases) were: Martin Bormann (death in absen-
tia), Admiral Karl D6nitz (ten years), Hans Frank (death), Wilhelm Frick (death),
Hans Fritzsche (acquitted), Walther Funk (life imprisonment), Hermann G6ring
(death), Rudolf Hess (life imprisonment), General Alfred Jodl (death), Ernst Kalten-
brunner (death), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (death), Konstantin von Neurath (fif-
teen years), Franz von Papen (acquitted), Admiral Erich Rider (life imprisonment),
Joachim von Ribbentrop (death), Alfred Rosenberg (death), Fritz Sauckel (death),
Hjalmar Schacht (acquitted), Baldur von Schirach (twenty years), Arthur Seyss-In-
quart (death), Albert Speer (twenty years), and Julius Streicher (death). WHITNEY R.
HARRIs, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 477-81 (1954).
60 But see Arthur L. Berney, Revisiting a Conference Commemorating the Nuremberg
Trials: A Commentary from a Nuremberg Prosecutor, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 276 n.6
(1997) ("The most commonly heard criticism was that the tribunal created by victori-
ous powers to try the vanquished, was a retroactive form of victors justice."); Makau
Mutua, From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or Retribution ?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTs.
L. REv. 77, 79-82 (2000) (raising similar concerns).
61 Under this defense, rejected at Nuremberg, national sovereignty could be used
to exonerate leaders for violations of international law. The IMT said that the test for
punishment was whether the actions in question violated international law, not Ger-
man domestic law. National leaders could be complying with German law, but that
was not enough-they had to comply with international law for their behavior to be
vindicated. Additionally, Nuremberg developed the doctrine that so-called superior
orders could serve as mitigation, but not as exoneration, for war crimes. Further-
more, Nuremberg declared that genocide and mass murder are unmitigable evils,
and constitute independent crimes against humanity. See supra notes 37, 43.
[VOL- 79:1
2003] LEGALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 73
tant: the ultimate war crime is the launching of an aggressive war-all
other war crimes flow from that. The principles of international crim-
inal law derived from the Nuremberg precedent were unanimously
affirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December
11, 1946, and became generally accepted as binding international
law. 62
B. The Political Model. The Example of Chile
A second, general model of transitional justice is leaving the past
behind in order to concentrate on the future. 63 Particularly where a
new government has emerged from a process of negotiation
grounded in political or military stalemate, a cornerstone of the tran-
sition often is legal amnesty for past human rights abuses. 64 Chile is
such a nation, having granted legal amnesty for human rights viola-
tions by the former regime for abuses up to a date certain, 1978. This
amnesty was used to lay the groundwork for the transition to democ-
racy, which culminated in free and peaceful elections ten years later.
65
On September 11, 1973, the recently appointed military com-
mander in chief of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, imposed martial law, os-
62 The "Nuremberg trial and subsequent proceedings did not wholly clarify the
rules on the taking of hostages and reprisals. These gaps were corrected by the 1949
Geneva Conventions." Henry T. King, Jr., Address: The Meaning of Nuremberg, 30 CASE
W. REs. J. INrT'L L. 143, 145 (1998).
63 See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
(A. James McAdams ed., 1997) [hereinafter RULE OF LAw] (printing essays concern-
ing transitional justice and the experience of several countries including Chile); 1-3
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 12 (examining more then twenty transitions follow-
ing World War II, including Chile's experience).
64 An analogous approach is "lustration," whereby officials and collaborators of
the previous regime, declared to have been an illegal regime by the new government,
are exposed publicly and prohibited from participating in the new government. See 2
TRANSITIONALJUSTICE, supra note 12, at 532-92 (detailing the experience of lustration
in Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic); Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legal-
ity and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of Transitional Justice, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
357, 365-85 (1999) (same); Mark S. Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustra-
tion Laws in the Former Communist Bloc, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at
181, 181-83 (same).
65 See 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 453-54 (summarizing events in
the Chilean transition); Stephen Kim Park, Dictators in the Dock: Retroactive Justice in
Consolidating Democracies, A Comparative Analysis of Chile and South Korea, 25 FLETCHER
F. WORLD ArE. 127, 127-34 (2001) (same); Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War:
Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TuLsAJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 253,
268-69 (1995) (same); RobertJ. Quinn, Note, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging
Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 905, 917-19 (1994) (same).
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tensibly to restore social order to the nation.6 6 Pinochet and his junta
immediately consolidated their grip over the country through a sys-
tematic campaign of repression aimed at eradicating all opposing
groups and individuals. 67 The Chilean National Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation later determined that 2279 individuals died
or "disappeared," though the actual number may be higher.68
Despite the oppression, Chile enjoyed an economic boom under
Pinochet.69 His successful economic reform gave Pinochet many sup-
porters, even though opposition grew steadily throughout the 1980s. 70
Apparently believing that the people would support him if given the
chance, Pinochet permitted a plebiscite allowing citizens to vote for or
against his regime. He lost.7 1 Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat
with the backing of a center-left coalition, assumed power in March
1990, but not until Pinochet negotiated an amnesty deal.72
As a result of the settlement with the newly-elected government,
Pinochet was named commander in chief of the armed forces until
1998, and thereafter to be appointed senator for life. Because of the
associated immunities and statutes of limitations, Pinochet was
shielded from prosecution for any crimes committed during his
66 Park, supra note 65, at 131.
67 Id. "The most intense and brutal repression was carried out in the initial years
under Pinochet.... Indeed, it has been estimated that more than 45,000 people were
detained and 1,500 killed by the end of 1973 alone." Id.
68 Id. (citing REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND REC-
ONCILIATION (Phillip E. Berryman trans., 1993)).
69 ' Id. at 132. Given the unique history of Chile among its neighbors, it is perhaps
not surprising that an enduring legacy of the junta is its economic program:
An open market economy was instituted [by the junta], and the ideas of
intellectuals and politicians, such as Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman,
Michael Novak, and Margaret Thatcher, were frequently mentioned as
sources of inspiration for Chilean public policies. The new model estab-
lished deep roots and, with minor changes, it prevailed even after the armed
forces left power.
Jorge Correa Sutil, "No Victorious Army Has Ever Been Prosecuted... The Unsettled Stry
of Transitional Justice in Chile, in RULE OF LAW, supra note 63, at 125.
70 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 453. Pinochet was forced to declare
a state of siege in 1983, which led to the arrest of 1200 people. 2 id. In 1986, 15,000
people were arrested and a new state of siege declared in response to popular demon-
strations and an assassination attempt on Pinochet. 2 id. At the same time, the gov-
ernment's violations of the human rights of its citizens drew increasing international
condemnation. 2 id. InJanuary 1987, in anticipation of an historic visit by PopeJohn
Paul II, the state of siege was lifted and political parties were permitted to resume
activities, though the government continued its iron grip on power through the secur-
ity forces. 2 id. at 454.
71 2 id.
72 Park, supra note 65, at 132.
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rule. 73 In 1990, the Chilean Supreme Court also affirmed the consti-
tutionality of an earlier Amnesty Law, thereby shutting the door on
the prosecution of those involved in human rights violations.74
In 1998, the world community became involved in the Pinochet
affair, when a Spanish warrant, executed in London, led to his arrest
for human rights violations. Following a long extradition battle, Pi-
nochet was eventually returned to Chile. 75 Shortly thereafter, in May
2000, the Chilean courts reinterpreted the immunity given under the
73 Id. (citing Nehal Bhuta, Note, Justice Without Borders? Prosecuting General Pi-
nochet, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 499, 510-11 (1999)).
74 Id.
75 On October 16, 1998, Pinochet, who was in London for medical treatment, was
detained on a Spanish warrant for human right violations, specifically murder, torture
and hostage-taking. Bringing the General to Justice, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1998, at 23.
Spain's warrant was based on international treaties to which both Spain and the
United Kingdom were parties. Perez, supra note 12, at 191. In Chile, Pinochet sup-
porters protested the detention, but opponents of Pinochet held protests of their
own. Clifford Krauss, Pinochet Case Reviving Voices of the Tortured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2000, at Al; Clifford Krauss, Threats over Pinochet Case Inflaming Tensions in Chile, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1998, at Al. The Chilean government immediately declared that an
extradition would be a violation of the national sovereignty of Chile and demanded
the return of Pinochet. The two leading candidates for the 1999 Chilean presidential
election, one conservative and the other socialist, both demanded the return of Pi-
nochet stating that he should properly be tried by Chilean courts. Clifford Krauss,
Freed by Britain, Pinochet is Facing a New Legal Battle at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at
Al.
The detention of Pinochet landed the British government in a political and legal
thicket. The House of Lords issued three separate rulings in the case. In Ex parte
Pinochet I, the House of Lords overturned a lower court decision refusing extradition
because Pinochet enjoyed immunity due to his status as former Head of State. Regina
v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302 (H.L. 1998); see also Bringing the General to
Justice, supra, at 23. In Ex pane Pinochet II, the first ruling was set aside on procedural
grounds because one of the judges had connections with an intervenor, Amnesty In-
ternational. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet
Ugartet (No.2), 1 E.R. 577 (H.L. 1999). Ex parte Pinochet III modified Ex parte Pinochet
, holding that Pinochet was only extraditable for crimes that occurred after all rele-
vant states had become parties to the Torture Convention. Regina v. Bartle et al., Ex
parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999). In the end, on March 2, 2000, after 503
days of incarceration, Pinochet was returned to Chile following a decision by the Brit-
ish Home Secretary, Jack Straw, not to extradite him to Spain. The General Sneaks
Away, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2000, at 57.
The Spanish request for extradition proved to Chile that their democracy was
perhaps not as fragile as they had thought. Even though there had been wide-spread
protests from opposing groups, the lack of violence in the Pinochet extradition case
demonstrated to the government that perhaps justice for the past victims of the Pi-
nochet regime might be pursued without risking a civil war. Matt Moffett,
Guatemalans March to Court to Redress Horrors of War: Pinochet Case Emboldens Latin Ameri-
can Calls for Justice, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 19, 2000, at 1. Current Chilean president
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Amnesty Law,76 which led to a warrant being issued for Pinochet's
arrest on charges of homicide and kidnapping.77 That case was over-
turned by the Chilean Supreme Court on procedural grounds.78 In
March 2001, a Chilean appellate court ruled that Pinochet could be
tried for covering up murders but could not be tried for the underly-
ing crimes themselves. 79 In an anticlimactic denouement, in July
2001, a panel of the Chilean Court of Appeals held that Pinochet was
mentally unfit to stand trial, and the case ended.80
The Spanish request for extradition and the subsequent decisions
from the British House of Lords illustrate the core problem with inter-
national jurisdiction for human rights crimes: too often national con-
cerns are overlooked when the situation is viewed from the
international level. Where there are political reasons for granting im-
munity, the international community must recognize that the nation
may have made a difficult decision in which it balanced the needs of
justice with the desire to avoid civil war.
Chile is an especially intricate example of this situation. Pinochet
was an evil dictator, but his peaceful relinquishment of power in ex-
change for immunity may have avoided a civil war. This example
raises some obvious questions for the architects of the ICC. Will the
next powerful dictator with military backing refuse to surrender
peacefully, knowing that the international community might not ac-
cept an agreement struck with a transitional government?81 Chile
lends at least some support to those who fear that the inflexibility of
Lagos promised that Pinochet would no longer enjoy immunity from prosecution. See
Clifford Krauss, Man in the News: Ricardo Lagos Escobar, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 18, 2000, at A3.
76 Clifford Krauss, Ruling on Immunity Puts Chile Closer to Trial of Pinochet, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2000 at A4.
77 This change also has subjected most former army intelligence directors to the
possibility of being prosecuted. Moffett, supra note 75.
78 Park, supra note 65, at 127.
79 Court Reduces Pinochet Charges, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 30, 2001, available at 2001
WL 15737829. Moreover, due to an apparent drafting oversight, it is possible that
Chilean courts in the future might declare that the "disappeared" will be presumed to
have been kidnapped, a crime not covered under the Amnesty Law, thus giving some
hope that those responsible for the "disappearances" could still be tried for their
crimes. See Krauss, supra note 76.
80 He's Demented, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2001, at 36. According to The Economist,
"Neither the centre-left government nor the conservative opposition wanted it to con-
tinue. Both saw it as a distraction ahead of a congressional election in December." Id.
81 See Perez, supra note 12, at 216-21 (citing the example of Cuba and Fidel Cas-
tro). For an actual situation that arose after we set forth this hypothetical, see Ken-
neth R. Bazinet, Bush Closer to Decision on Troops to Liberia, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 4,
2003, at 7 ("Nigeria offered [President Charles] Taylor exile, but before he accepts a
deal, he wants immunity from UN war crimes charges he already faces.").
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international law that the Rome Statute embodies could lead to a
bloody civil war.8 2
C. Truth and Reconciliation: South Africa's "Mixed" Model
South Africa presents a striking example of a "third way" to ap-
proach transitional justice. Rather than immediate prosecution of the
perpetrators of human rights violations, the nation chose to empha-
size "restorative" rather than "retributive" or "deterrent" justice. As
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, head of South Africa's Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission (TRC), explained:
[R]etributive justice-in which an impersonal state hands down
punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for
the perpetrator-is not the only form of justice. I contend that
there is another kind ofjustice, restorative justice, which was charac-
teristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central con-
cern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu,
the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restora-
tion of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabili-
tate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the
opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has
injured.8 3
82 On the other hand, the final chapter of the Pinochet saga has not been writ-
ten. Perhaps Chile will demonstrate that a truly democratic society cannot be
achieved without openly confronting the past, and that a peaceful transition to de-
mocracy is not always the path to true national reconciliation. As one woman who lost
her husband to Pinochet's death-squads ominously warns, "Truth and justice have
long been delayed.... The government has never really addressed the problem of the
tortured and the disappeared. Now that deep hurt can no longer be ignored, let
alone forgotten." Isabel Chadwick, 'The Hurt Can No Longer Be Ignored,' NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 7, 1998, at 43.
83 DESMOND MPILO TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 54-55 (1999). For a
discussion of the concept of restorative justice, particularly in the context of societies
in transition from an oppressive political regime to a free, democratic government,
see Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on
Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68-98 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson
eds., 2000); Charles Villa-Vicencio, Restorative Justice: Dealing With the Past Differently, in
LOOKING BACK, REACHING FoRwARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 68 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Werwoerd eds.,
2000) [hereinafter LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD]. The African concept of
ubuntu has been rendered as "humaneness" in English. See Kiss, supra, at 81. One
commentator, Professor Elizabeth Kiss of Duke University, in describing the origins of
restorative justice, notes that "restorative justice has been championed by people from
many different traditions, religions, and cultures, from the Japanese to the Maori of
New Zealand, and that the TRC traced the notion of restorative justice both to
'Judaeo-Christian tradition' and to 'African traditional values' like ubuntu." Id. at 86.
The South African TRC, discussing the idea of ubuntu in its final report, quotes an
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Apartheid, which until recent decades was the controlling politi-
cal system in South Africa, was based upon four core ideas:
First, the population of South Africa comprised four "racial
groups"-White, Coloured, Indian, and African-each with its own
inherent culture. Second, Whites, as the civilized race, were enti-
tled to have absolute control over the state. Third, white interests
should prevail over black interests; the state was not obliged to pro-
vide equal facilities for the subordinate races. Fourth, the white ra-
cial group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans- and English-
speaking components, while Africans belonged to several ...dis-
tinct nations or potential nations-a formula that made the white
nation the largest in the country.
84
Naturally, this system led to decades of political strife and violent
protests.
In 1977, the United Nations imposed an embargo on all arms
shipments to South Africa.8 5 In the mid-1980s, violence and protest
escalated in black South African townships, culminating in the procla-
mation of a national state of emergency. 86
In 1989, F.W. de Klerk was elected president of South Africa.8 7 In
a speech before Parliament on February 2, 1990, de Klerk declared
that "the time for negotiation has arrived," and announced the begin-
African proverb: "umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu-people are people through other peo-
ple." 1 S. AFR. TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, ch. 5, 1 80-88, at 125-28 (1998) [hereinafter TRC
REPORT] (noting that one of the main tasks of the TRC was "restoring the human and
civil dignity of victims"); see alsoJustice Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South
Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 15 (1998). Strangely, Professor Kiss goes on to state
that "[i]n its genesis, restorative justice .... is not concerned with exclusively theolog-
ical concepts like the salvation of the soul, but with themes like human dignity, re-
spect and mercy." Kiss, supra, at 83-86. If Professor Kiss means to imply that human
dignity, mercy, and respect for each human being are not integral aspects of modern
western theology, she is, of course, mistaken. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGE-
LIUM VITAE [ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE] (1995). For a further
discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of the South African TRC, see infra
notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
84 LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 190 (3d ed. 2001). The
rapid expansion of the South African economy during World War II and concomitant
social tensions led to a backlash by the radical Afrikaaner government after the war.
Id. at 177-86.
85 Id. at 214. In 1979, one of the authors of this article (R.J.R.) served as an
intern at the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, where his assign-
ment was to monitor trade with South Africa for any violations of this embargo.
86 Id. at 212.
87 Id. at 237. Apparently due to his temper, de Klerk's predecessor P.W. Botha
was known as "die Groot Krokodil"-the Great Crocodile. NELSON MANDELA, A LONG
WALK TO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA 478 (1994).
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ning of the dismantling of apartheid. The bans on black political or-
ganizations were lifted; certain political prisoners were released;
capital punishment was abolished; and many of the curbs related to
the preexisting state of emergency were ended.88 De Klerk then be-
gan preparing for constitutional negotiations by having remaining
apartheid laws repealed, releasing over a thousand political prisoners,
canceling the state of emergency, and continuing negotiations with
Nelson Mandela and the ANC.89
The negotiations culminated in a February 1993 agreement on a
timetable for change in South Africa. A new parliament would be
elected in April 1994, which would have the task of drafting a new
constitution. In the meantime, negotiators-including Mandela, de
Klerk, and the representatives of eighteen other parties-hammered
out an interim constitution which was to take effect after the
election.90
P.W. Botha offered to free Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners as early
as 1985, provided they would renounce violence. Id. at 244. Mandela and the others
refused because the offer did not include reform of apartheid. Id. Mandela subse-
quently wrote to Botha in January 1989, outlining a negotiated settlement intended to
reassure the white minority against concerns of majority dominance if apartheid were
abolished. Id. Mandela wrote:
Two political issues will have to be addressed; firstly, the demand for major-
ity rule in a unitary state, secondly, the concern of white South Africa over
this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on structural guarantees that
majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks. The
most crucial tasks which will face the government and the ANC [African
National Congress] will be to reconcile these two positions.
Id. at 476. Botha was a hardline Afrikaaner leader who resigned as President only
after suffering a debilitating stroke, but not before "crossing the Rubicon" by meeting
with Mandela and shaking his hand in a formal setting in July 1989. Id. at 480. At
that meeting, no real progress was made, but in a fascinating exchange, Mandela
drew a parallel between the Afrikaaner rebellion in 1914 and the long struggle for
black liberation in South Africa, and then asked Botha to free all political prisoners,
an offer Botha declined. Id. at 479-80.
88 Id. at 484-85. Mandela himself was released on February 11, 1990, with very
little advance notice, but without making any concessions concerning his subsequent
behavior. Id. at 485-91. At his first press conference after regaining his freedom,
Mandela proclaimed that "[w] hites are fellow South Africans ... and we want them to
feel safe and to know that we appreciate the contribution they have made toward the
development of this country." Id. at 495.
89 THOMPSON, supra note 84, at 246-47.
90 Id. at 252. The interim constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, elec-
tion of the President by the lower house, forced coalition government through the
appointment of "executive deputy presidents" by parties with large numbers of seats
in the legislature, power sharing in the cabinet also based upon legislative strength,
and a large catalogue of fundamental rights. Id. at 250-51.
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In the 1994 election, the ANC received over 60% of the vote.9 1
On May 10, 1994, Mandela was inaugurated President of South Af-
rica.9 2 The new constitution contained a "Postamble" providing that,
in certain circumstances, amnesty was to be granted for crimes com-
mitted in furtherance of political objectives in the past, and that it was
up to Parliament to legislate the mechanics and conditions for grant-
ing such amnesty. 93
On May 27, 1994, the new Justice Minister, Dullah Omar, an-
nounced to the Parliament that it was the intention of the govern-
ment to form a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 94 Omar
explained the intent of the TRC process thusly:
If the wounds of the past are to be healed, if a multiplicity of legal
actions are to be avoided, if future human rights violations are to be
avoided, and indeed, if we are to successfully initiate the building of
a human rights culture, then disclosure of the truth and its acknowl-
edgment are essential. We cannot forgive on behalf of victims, nor
do we have the moral right to do so. It is the victims themselves who
must speak. Their voices need to be heard. The fundamental issue
for all South Africans is therefore to come to terms with our past on
91 MANDELA, supra note 87, at 539. The National Party (NP) captured a majority
in the Western Cape Province, where so-called "coloured" voters-primarily individu-
als of Indian and Asian descent-voted with whites. Id. at 539.
92 Id. at 540.
93 The Interim Constitution provided:
In order to advance reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be
granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political
objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this
end, Parliament under the Constitution shall adopt a law providing the
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through
which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been
passed.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 16 (1994). The origin of the Postamble is, apparently, somewhat
murky. The deputy chairperson of the TRC, Alex Boraine, endorses the view that the
Postamble's clarity of language is due to the time constraints weighing upon the draft-
ers of the interim constitution, which led to the Postamble not being edited by the
technical committee responsible for drafting, thus explaining the lack of legal or
technical language in the postamble's exhortation. ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UN-
MASKED 39-40 (2000) (citing the views of Lourens du Plessis).
94 BORAINE, supra note 93, at 40. The architects of the TRC were well aware of
the twenty or so truth commissions all over the world in the past twenty-five years,
some famous-Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and some not so well known-Sri
Lanka, Chad, Uganda. See Priscilla Hayner, Same Species, Different Animal: How South
Africa Compares to Other Truth Commissions Worldwide, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FOR-
WARD, supra note 83, at 34. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001).
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the only moral basis possible, namely that the truth be told and that
the truth be acknowledged.
95
In response to the government's proposal, Parliament in 1995 en-
acted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (Act)
which established the TRC with the instruction that it take up the task
of "promot[ing] national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of under-
standing which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past."96
95 BoRAINE, supra note 93, at 41. The idea of a truth commission was denounced
by both the NP and the Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party, who feared that such a process
would lead to a witch hunt. MARTIN MEREDITH, COMING TO TERMS 18 (2000). The NP
called for general amnesty and amnesia as the best way for South Africa to move
forward. Id. On the other hand, there also were calls for Nuremberg-style trials and
reparations to be paid by the white community. Id. President Mandela was con-
cerned that putting criminals on trial would lead to a coup. Id. at 19 ("Mandela
himself once remarked privately that if he were to announce a series of criminal trials,
he could well wake up the following morning to find his home ringed by tanks.").
96 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 83, ch. 11, app. 1, at 304. The TRC was to investi-
gate fully gross violations of human rights committed by any person or organization
during the relevant period, including "the antecedents, circumstances, factors and
context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives
and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations." 1
id. ch. 6, 1, at 135. The TRC was given the mandate to investigate gross human
rights violations beginning with the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, through May 10,
1994 (the date the ANC came to power). 1 id. ch. 13, at 498-506. The TRC was
granted broad subpoena powers with the concomitant powers of search and seizure.
1 id. ch. 12, 33, at 441. In the investigative process, every effort was made to ease
the discomfort of victims and their families, particularly in testifying before the TRC.
See Tirru, supra note 83, at 81-83 (describing the accommodations made to help
ensure that victims would come forward). It was also, however, important to establish
a true historical record which might not be possible through any other process. Arch-
bishop Tutu explained:
The criminal justice system is not the best way to arrive at the truth. There is
no incentive for perpetrators to tell the truth, and often the court must de-
cide between the word of a victim against the evidence of many perpetrators.
Such legal proceedings are also harrowing experiences for victims, who are
invariably put through extensive cross-examination.
MEREDITH, supra note 95, at 316 (quoting Archbishiop Tutu). Eventually, 21,300 indi-
viduals presented petitions to the TRC. 4 TRC REPORT, supra note 83, ch. 10,
12-14, at 285-87.
One commentator has enumerated several forces that coalesced into the com-
promise known as the TRC: a political stalemate with no clearly dominant winner; a
negotiated settlement of apartheid rather than a revolutionary takeover; a graduated
shift from the apartheid government to democracy; the fragility of the resultant de-
mocracy; the fear that the security forces would "derail" the shift to democracy; a
culture of gross human rights violations; a commitment to overcome that legacy; the
shift from parliamentary to constitutional sovereignty; and, the constitutional commit-
ments to nation-building, reconciliation, and amnesty for past violations of human
rights. Johnny De Lange, The Historical Context, Legal Origins and Philosophical Founda-
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In carrying out its mandate to investigate and report on the de-
fined crimes, the TRC was given the power to grant amnesty to "per-
sons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts
associated with a political objective and comply with the requirements
of [the] Act."97 Amnesty was only granted after the applicant made a
full accounting of his actS,98 provided that he had been truthful, and
had disclosed under whose orders he acted. 99
The amnesty powers of the TRC were controversial,100 but the
compromise resulting in the amnesty provision in the South African
constitution embodied both a skepticism regarding the efficacy and
utility of retributive, criminal prosecutions, and a real concern about
the practical problems involved in prosecution of such large-scale
crimes committed over so many years. 10 1 If individual justice were not
tion of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in LOOKING BACK, REACH-
ING FORWARD, supra note 83, at 14, 17-18. That same commentator, an ANC member
and Member of Parliament in South Africa, states several other reasons why South
Africa "had no choice" but to establish the TRC: international pressure; the TRC pro-
vided a structured and manageable alternative to vengeance or Nuremberg-style tri-
als; the need for a common memory to be recorded; the yearning for an honorable
conclusion to a shameful past; and, perhaps most interestingly, the call of "our moral-
ity as a people who want to heal our nation, and restore the faith of those in our
country and the international community in our common future." Id. at 18.
97 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 83, ch. 4, 31, at 55.
98 The Amnesty Committee of the TRC evaluated each application in light of
several criteria: the motive of the offense; the factual and legal circumstances under
which the act was committed; the objective of the act, including political dimensions
and whether it was directed against an individual or organization; whether the perpe-
trator was a member of a political organization; and, the proportionality of the act to
the objective. These criteria were based upon principles drafted by Carl Norgaard,
former president of the European Human Rights Commission, during the political
transition in Namibia, and upon a study of state practices regarding exceptions to
extradition law for political offenses. Richard Lyster, Amnesty: The Burden of Victims, in
LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD, supra note 83, at 184, 188-89, 299 n.19. For the
statutory prerequisites to amnesty, see § 20(1)-(3) of Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr).
99 §§ 18(1)-22(2) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of
1995 (S. Afr.). The amnesty provision was carried out by a subcommittee of the TRC
that was made up entirely ofjudges and lawyers, unlike the human rights investigation
committee. See BORAINE, supra note 93, at 116-17.
100 See Lyster, supra note 98, at 186. On the question whether states have the obli-
gation under international law to prosecute perpetrators of human rights violations,
see Diane F. Orentlichter, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Viola-
tions of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (supporting a duty to prosecute grave
violations of human rights and calling for procedural mechanisms in international
human rights conventions to ensure a victim's ability to prosecute perpetrators).
101 See Lyster, supra note 98, at 186-88 (detailing the problems and potential futil-
ity of individual criminal prosecutions).
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possible, at least an historical accounting and collective reckoning
would be. 10 2
The TRC final report'0 3 explained that restorative justice "seeks
to redefine crime: it shifts the primary focus of crime from the break-
ing of laws or offences against a faceless state to a perception of crime
as violations against human beings... [It] encourages victims, offend-
ers and the community to be directly involved in resolving conflict."' 0 4
102 "'We have a nation of victims, and if we are unable to provide complete justice
on an individual basis . . .it is possible for us to ensure that there is historical and
collective justice for the people of our country.'" Id. at 188 (quoting remarks of for-
merJustice Minister Dullah Omar). In its report, the TRC noted that "[t]he issue is
not... a straight trade-off between amnesty and criminal or civil trials," but rather "a
choice between more or less full disclosure." 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 83, ch. 5,
71, at 122.
103 After completing its work, the TRC compiled and produced a five-volume re-
port detailing the results of its efforts. The comprehensive report made clear that
very few groups in South African society were without blame during the apartheid
years. The NP and its governments, particularly that of P.W. Botha during the 1970s,
were singled out as perpetrators of a criminal regime. 2 TRC REPORT, supra note 83,
ch. 5, 263, at 470. The Inkatha Freedom Party and ANC also were found to have
committed serious crimes, including causing the deaths of scores of political oppo-
nents. 2 id. ch. 7, 460, at 685.
The TRC Report even touched President Mandela's family with its recital of
human rights violations committed by his wife, Winnie Mandela, in the 1980s. 2 id.
ch. 6, 110, at 581. The candor of the TRC Report apparently surprised some of its
subjects in the ANC and they attempted to interdict the publication of the report on
the day before it was due to be presented to President Mandela, but the High Court
in Cape Town rebuffed the attempt. See MEREDITH, supra note 95, at 304-05. Arch-
bishop Tutu was particularly incensed at the ANC's tactics: "I have struggled against a
tyranny. I did not do that to substitute another .... I didn't struggle in order to
remove one set of those who thought they were tin gods and replace them with others
.... " Id. at 303. On October 29, 1998, President Mandela accepted the TRC Report,
"with all its imperfections," and stated that it would provide a "foundation of the edi-
fice of reconciliation," but that the "further construction of that house of peace" re-
quired the efforts of all South Africans. Id. at 306.
104 1 TRC REPORT, supra note 83, ch. 5, 81, at 126. See Charles Villa-Vicencio,
Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where The International Criminal Court
and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 214 (2000) (noting the comments of
Archbishop Tutu regarding restorative justice). Restorative justice is a sophisticated
concept, "involv[ing] the restoration of relationships as a basis for the prevention of
the reoccurrence of human rights abuses and the reparation of damage to the per-
sonal dignity and well-being of victims." Villa-Vicencio, supra note 83, at 70. Villa-
Vicencio views restorative justice as a "holistic" theory of justice, and states that:
As democracy necessarily includes more than universal franchise, so it is
wrong to reduce justice to a functioning judicial system. It has to do with a
nation committed to a set of moral values that provides the basis of what Lon
Fuller refers to as a "relatively stable reciprocity of expectation between law-
giver and subject." This involves holding in creative tension a number of
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Restorative justice "includes the restoration of the moral worth and
equal dignity of all people as well as the restoration of social equality.
It is a process that must be seen to emerge within the context of differ-
ent layers of justice."' 0 5
The TRC process did not fulfill all of its goals. Its architects have
no illusions that the TRC by itself can "restore" the nation. 10 6 Never-
important ideals that sometimes contradict each other-ideals that extend
beyond the capacity of any single judicial procedure to deliver. Restorative
justice is, as such, a theory of justice that needs to pervade all of society,
rather than a specific act in and of itself.
Id. (citation omitted). Villa-Vicencio goes on list several concerns that he believes are
implicated in efforts of transitional societies to provide restorative justice: an organ-
ized system ofjustice complying with international standards on human rights; admin-
istration ofjustice to everyone's benefit, including the institution of peace even at the
expense of punishment; the promotion of moral values that make for shared commit-
ment to a society governed by the rule of law; accountability for gross violations of
human rights; a sense of shared politica rather than criminal guilt; punishment,
where necessary; rehabilitation of victims, to the extent possible; and, the acknowledg-
ment of the truth about the past. Id. at 70-72. He also quotes several others to make
the point that truth-telling is vital to, and may be a form ofjustice in and of itself. Id.
at 72.
105 Villa-Vicencio, supra note 104, at 215 (footnote omitted). Professor Villa-
Vicencio adumbrates the other "layers of justice" to which he refers, and the signifi-
cance of each:
1) Retributive justice affirms the place of lex talionis ("an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth") as an alternative to unbridled revenge.
2) Deterrent justice has a place in seeking to limit atrocities in the future.
3) Compensatory justice that requires beneficiaries of the old order to share in
programs of restitution needs to be explored.
4) Rehabilitative justice that addresses the needs of both victims and survivors
is important. The needs of victims must be redressed. The psychological and
anti-social needs of perpetrators also need to be met. No nation can afford
the presence of unrehabilitated torturers and killers.
5) Justice as the affirmation of human dignity recognizes the equal dignity of all
people.
6) Justice as exoneration affirms the need for the records of persons who have
been falsely accused by the state and/or within their own communities to be
put straight.
No model ofjustice covers all the stops.
Id.
106 As for impunity, the actual experience in the TRC would not seem to give
much hope to future human rights violators. Out of a total of 7000 applications, only
150 were granted amnesty, 4500 (mostly common criminals) were denied, and the
rest await final determination. Some of these decisions were highly controversial. For
example, the Committee on Amnesty granted a blanket amnesty to ANC leader, and
now President, Thabo Mbeki and thirty-six other ANC activists without requiring
them to publicly disclose their crimes. MEREDITH, supra note 95, at 314. This decision
caused an uproar in the white community and led the TRC itself to attempt to over-
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theless, the South African model of restorative justice-amnesty for
public confession, no civil liability but the availability of reparations,
the recognition of collective political responsibility (though of differ-
ent degrees) for the nation's sorrowful past-seems to have tread suc-
cessfully the boundaries between retribution and forgiveness,
reconciliation and criminal justice, and, ultimately, civil war and
peace.' 0 7 It might be added that the TRC process has kept the peace
in South Africa for over a decade when all indications would have
suggested civil war.
II. THE ICC AND THE INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL MODEL
Even a brief discussion of the political history ofjust a few nations
that have made the transition from tyranny to democracy reveals two
things. First, each transitional nation has its own complex history and
political dilemmas from which the transitional settlement emerges.
Second, it is incorrect to characterize the choice faced by these socie-
ties as rewarding impunity with amnesties or prosecution of wrongdo-
ers. Transitions such as those in Germany, Chile, and South Africa
are complex, and the choices faced by leaders are full of political nu-
ance, tinged with great uncertainty about the future. Almost always,
many lives ride on those choices.
A. An International Criminal Court is Born
Cognizant of the challenges faced by countries undergoing transi-
tions from tyranny to democracy, in recent years the international
turn the decision, to no avail. Id. Moreover, victims were not left entirely without
remedies. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act mandated that
the TRC have a Committee on Reparation and Reconciliation that would, among
other things, recommend the granting of reparations to victims of gross human rights
violations, to be paid from a fund established by the government. § 4(f) of Promo-
tion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.); see also 5 TRC
REPORT, supra note 83, ch. 5, 5, 42, at 170, 178. TRC Chairman Tutu has ex-
pressed the hope that all victims would receive approximately $23,000 in reparation
payments each, paid over six years, though the government has not budgeted nearly
that amount. See TUTU, supra note 83, at 58. He also noted that there was some price
extracted from the perpetrators by making them publicly testify to their acts:
Let us imagine what this means. Often this is the first time that an appli-
cant's family and community learn that an apparently decent man was, for
instance, a callous torturer or a member of a ruthless death squad that assas-
sinated many opponents of the previous regime. There is, therefore, a price
to be paid. Public disclosure results in public shaming and, sometimes, a
marriage may be a sad casualty as well.
MEREDITH, supra note 95, at 317 (quoting Archbishop Tutu).
107 De Lange, supra note 96, at 25-26.
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community has attempted to craft institutions that will foster peace
and respect for human rights. Emboldened by the example of Nu-
remberg, the United Nations set up ad hoc tribunals to prosecute in-
dividuals accused of human rights violations in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia. In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly in-
structed the International Law Commission (ILC) to prepare a draft
statute for a permanent international criminal court. 108 Two years
later, the ILC presented its draft to the United Nations General As-
sembly, which established an ad hoc committee to refine the provi-
sions of the ILC draft. The ad hoc committee held several sessions in
1995, and at the end of that year requested that the General Assembly
convert it into a preparatory committee so that it could begin redraft-
ing the statute. 109
In 1998, the United Nations convened the United Nations Diplo-
matic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an In-
ternational Criminal Court to negotiate specifics related to the
formation of an International Criminal Court. Despite numerous un-
resolved issues, the delegates at that conference adopted a draft
statute. 110
The Rome Conference did not represent an exercise in multilat-
eral treaty-making, in which unanimity of decisionmaking is the fun-
damental feature.' Rather, the governments of the world engaged
in what was, in fact, a quasi-legislative effort.11 2 More than a treaty,
the Rome Statute changes international law in a way that will be bind-
108 Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter defines the Security Council's
central role in the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER
art. 39. Strained relations during the Cold War prevented much advancement for
several decades. See Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 3, at 38-39 (not-
ing that "U]ustice was the Cold War's casualty").
109 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT: MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE DRATr STATUTE pt. L.A (rev. ed. 1998),
available at http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/papers/RomeTreaty/LCHRUnre-
solvedlssues.pdf.
110 Rome Statute, supra note 6. The Rome Conference left certain issues un-
resolved, and the General Assembly assigned these issues to the Preparatory Commit-
tee to be finalized. The unresolved issues included the formulation of rules of
procedure and evidence, the definition of aggression, and elements of crimes addi-
tional to the definition of those crimes in the ICC statute. For a history of the events
leading up to the Rome Statute, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an
International Criminal Court, 1 INn. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-19 (1991).
111 See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 607-40
(5th ed. 1998) (describing characteristics of international transactions); LORD MC-
NAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 1-236 (1961) (explaining the theory, terminology, consti-
tutional requirements, and ratification process of treaty-making).
112 See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 52, at 163-79.
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ing (at least in some cases) on non-signatories."13 As the Preamble to
the Rome Statute notes, the purpose of the ICC is to end impunity for
the perpetrators of "atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity."1 1
4
The ICC will have the unique power to prosecute and sentence
individuals, and also to impose obligations of cooperation upon
states,' 15 regardless "of whether they are parties to relevant treaties or
have accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crimes in
question."'" 6 It was agreed in Rome that the court would have juris-
diction over four core crimes: genocide,1 17 crimes against human-
ity,"" war crimes,119 and the crime of aggression. 120
113 See generally Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Commission, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10-5, at 79-80, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [herinafter Report of the International Law Commission] (setting
forth the preconditions to the exercise ofjurisdiction); A.B.A. Task Force, supra note
5, at 257; Carter, supra note 5, at 300-04 (containing a recommendation on the ICC,
crafted by the Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations);
Dickinson, supra note 5 (tracing the procedural history of the International Criminal
Court).
114 Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl., 37 I.L.M. at 1002.
115 Phakiso Mochochoko, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 13, at 305-14 (exploring the limits of the
"duty to cooperate").
116 Dickinson, supra note 5, at 13 (adopting language supporting automatic juris-
diction over crimes under the Rome Statute, without requiring additional declaration
of consent by states); see also Lara A. Ballard, Comment, The Recognition and Enforce-
ment of International Criminal Court Judgments in U.S. Courts, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 143, 163 (1997) ("States parties to the ICC treaty that have accepted the ICC's
jurisdiction with regard to the crime in question must 'respond without undue delay
to the request,' which may be for the disclosure of evidence, the apprehension of
suspects, or another form ofjudicial or police assistance.") (quoting Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission, supra note 113, art. 51(b), at 129) (footnote omitted).
117 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1003.
118 See id. art. 5(1) (b), 37 I.L.M. at 1003. The list includes rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, enforced disappear-
ance, and persecution. Id. art. 7, 37 I.L.M. at 1004-05. See generally Benjamin B. Fer-
encz, Book Review, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 218, 219 (2000) ("The emotionally charged
issue of 'forced pregnancy' required delicate compromises with Catholic and Arab
countries, which feared interference with national laws prohibiting abortion.").
119 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1)(c), 37 I.L.M. at 1004.
120 Id. art. 5(1)(d), 37 I.L.M. at 1004. The text of the Rome Statute does not
define the crime of aggression. The delegates at the Rome Conference were unable
to agree on a definition of this crime and "essentially agreed to disagree." Grant M.
Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMp. L.
413, 418 (2000). U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer pointed out that the inclusion of
this crime was an ill-conceived concession to advocates, and the future definition
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The requirement in the Rome Statute that sixty states ratify the
Statute before the Court can come into existence was met on April 11,
2002, with the simultaneous submission of ten instruments of ratifica-
tion.1 2' Nevertheless, there remains significant opposition to the ICC
in the world community. 122 Perhaps most notably, the United States,
"could be without limit and call into question any use of military forces or even eco-
nomic sanctions." Smidt, supra note 22, at 204.
One model based liability for the crime of aggression on the individual responsi-
bility model contained within the Nuremberg Charter, fashioned for use by the Inter-
national Military Tribunal following World War II. See Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 36, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288. The second model simu-
lated U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, adopted in 1974, which placed respon-
sibility for the crime of aggression with the states themselves. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Annex, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3314 (1974).
The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court set forth three possible definitions of aggression. See Dawson, supra, at 418.
The Rome Statute establishes the crimes that are within the Court's jurisdiction as
follows:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has juris-
diction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1003-04. The Statute continues
and defines the crimes under (a), (b), and (c); however, the definition of subsection
(d) provides:
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Id. art. 5(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1004. As a result, jurisdiction over crimes of aggression,
whatever that will come to mean, will not be exercised by the ICC until it is defined
and approved by the parties to the Rome Statute.
121 On that date, ratifications were submitted by the nations of: Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, Jordan,
Mongolia, Niger, Romania, and Slovakia, which took the number of ratifications to a
total of sixty-six. "This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after
the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrnment of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations."
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 126, 37 I.L.M. at 1068; see also Marlise Simons, Without
Fanfare or Cases, International Court Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A3 (noting that
the "speed of the court's creation" exceeded expectations).
122 The United States, Israel, and the Holy See are among those nations that have
not yet ratified the Statute, though the United States and Israel both signed it on the
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which signed the Rome Statute,12 3 and announced that it has no in-
tention of ratifying it, 12 4 an event that some compared to "unsigning"
last day for which the Statute was open for signature, presumably to preserve their
ability to shape the Court in future preparatory meetings.
For a complete list of countries' positions on the Rome Statute and their status
regarding signature and/or ratification, and their expressed reservations concerning-
the court, see United Nations, U.N. Treaty Collection: Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partl/chapterXVIII/treatyl0.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
123 The signing came on December 31, 2000, less than a month before the end of
the Democratic Clinton Administration and after it was known that Bill Clinton would
be succeeded by Republican George W. Bush. With the signing, President Clinton
expressed concerns about "significant flaws" in the treaty, and he added: "I will not,
and do not recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice
and consent until fundamental concerns are satisfied." Statement on the Rome
Treaty on the International Criminal Court, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1 (Dec. 31,
2000); Lee A. Casey et al., The United States and the International Criminal Court:
Concerns and Possible Courses of Action 28 (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://
www.fed-soc.org/Publications/ Terrorism/ICC.pdf. Previously he had proclaimed to
the U.N. General Assembly, that "before the century ends, we should establish a per-
manent international court to prosecute the most serious violations of humanitarian
law." Ferencz, supra note 118, at 221 (quoting President Clinton's statement of Sept.
22, 1997).
124 The United States argues that the exercise ofjurisdiction under Article 12 cre-
ates disincentives for countries undertaking military actions on humanitarian and
human rights grounds because their soldiers may be subject to prosecution under the
Rome Statute. See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 12, 19 (1999) (arguing that negative consequences of the ICC
related to peace-establishing type interventions are responsible for the lack of Ameri-
can support for the ICC).
The former American Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, the leader of
the American delegation to the Rome Conference, has written that "the United States
has special responsibilities and special exposure to political controversy over [its] ac-
tions," a factor that "cannot be taken lightly when issues of international peace and
security are at stake," and that the United States is "called upon to act, sometimes at
great risk, far more than any other nation." Scheffer, supra, at 12. Ambassador Schef-
fer testified to the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee:
On the practical side, no other nation matches the extent of the United
States' overseas military commitments through alliances and special missions
such as current peacekeeping commitments in the former Yugoslavia. We
don't have the luxury of not considering these factors. On the legal side, the
provisions violate a fundamental principle of international law that a treaty
cannot be applied to a state that is not a party to it.
Statement by David Scheffer, Senior Advisor and Counsel to Ambassador Madeleine
K. Albright and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the
International Criminal Court, in the Sixth Committee, U.S.U.N. Press Rel. No.
165(96), at 8 (Oct. 31, 1996). As Scheffer also has noted, a state party might kill
thousands of people within its territory, and the United States might be called upon
to stop the killing. If a U.S. bomb inadvertently kills innocents, the nation could
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it.125 Ambassador for war crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper explained
the U.S. position on December 19, 2001:
As many of you know, the International Criminal Court has been a
point of concern for the United States. This concern has not
changed as a result of September 11th. While the United States has
sought from the inception of the debate at the end of World War II
a court that could be neutral, focused on the pursuit of efficient
justice, and most of all immune from the poisonous taint of raw
political power, the Bush administration, as with the previous ad-
ministration, opposes the Rome Treaty. And despite the signature
by President Clinton, we-like the previous administration-will
not send it to the United States Senate for ratification.
We are steadfast in our concerns and committed to our beliefs
that the United States cannot be part of a process that lacks the
essential safeguards to avoid a politicization of the process. We also
firmly believe that the ICC treaty is just that-a treaty. Therefore it
does not and should not have jurisdiction over a non-party state ab-
sent United Nations Security Council action. The United States has
a unique role in the world in helping to defend freedom and ad-
vance the cause of humanity. We will continue to meet our respon-
sibility but not at the price of our national security. 126
There are several factors that might influence a nation's decision
regarding ratification. Perhaps the most fundamental concern for
non-signatories, however, is the effect of the ICC's jurisdictional provi-
sions on the ability of sovereign states to deal with alleged human
rights violations on their own.1 27 Those jurisdictional provisions re-
hand the American officials over to the ICC while shielding its own wrongdoers. Dav-
enport, supra note 22, at 10.
125 At a minimum, the government's notification apparently relieves the United
States from its obligation under international law not to work against a treaty to which
it is a signatory. According to some accounts, it has done that since the announce-
ment. See Editorial, Doubling the Damage at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A20
(criticizing the Bush administration's "misguided campaign to demolish the Interna-
tional Criminal Court"); Serge Schmemann, U.S. Vetoes Bosnia Mission, Then Allows 3-
Day Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A3 (describing United States' efforts at the
U.N. Security Council to limit the impact of the ICC on American peacekeeping
troops); Serge Schmemann, U.S. vs. U.N. Court: Two Worldviews, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2002, at A8; Thom Shanker & James Dao, U.S. Might Refuse New Peace Duties Without
Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at Al.
126 John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrives-The U.S. Position: Sta-
tus and Prospects, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 873, 873-74 (2002) (quoting U.S. Ambassa-
dor-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre-Richard Prosper, Address at the Peace
Palace, The Hague, Neth. (Dec. 19, 2001)).
127 The International Court of Justice at The Hague, in contrast, has jurisdiction
over matters such as disputes between nations and treaty interpretation. National
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quire some explication to place the Court's powers in proper
context. 
128
B. The ICC's Jurisdiction: Complementarity and the Potential
for Overreach
Article 22 of the Rome Statute provides that "[a] person shall not
be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court."' 2 9 In the case of ambiguity, the definition shall
be construed in favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted. 130 The Court may exercise jurisdiction if (1) a State Party
refers a crime to the Court's prosecutor; (2) the Security Council, act-
ing under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, refers a crime
to the prosecutor; or (3) the prosecutor initiates an investigation into
a crime.13 ' Because the Security Council's actions under Chapter VII
are mandatory, the Court could exercise jurisdiction even when
neither the state territory where the crime was committed nor the
state of nationality of the offender were a party to the Rome
Statute. 132
If the matter is referred by a State Party or initiated proprio motu
by the prosecutor, the Court's jurisdiction is more restricted. In such
instances,jurisdiction extends to the territory of a non-party State only
if that State consents to the jurisdiction of the Court, and either the
acts were committed in the territory of the consenting State or the
accused is a national of the consenting State. 133 The Statute provides
courts never really had jurisdiction over matters like this, so there was less of a sover-
eignty issue with that court. Davenport, supra note 22, at 2.
128 Article 120 of the Rome Statute prohibits reservations in the signing of the
statute. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 120, 37 I.L.M. at 1066. That, however, did
not prevent at least some nations (notably France) from attaching declarations that
are very close to reservations. See United Nations, supra note 122 (asserting France's
fight to national self defense, defining military objectives, rejecting ICC jurisdiction
over collateral damage claims, and more).
129 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 22(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1015.
130 Id. art. 22(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1015.
131 Id. art. 13, 37 I.L.M. at 1010-11.
132 See id. art. 13(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1011; see also U.N. Conference of Plenipotentia-
ries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Background Information,
at http://www.un.org/icc/index.html (discussing the authority of the Security Coun-
cil to refer situations to the court) (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
133 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 4(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1003; id. art. 12(2), 37
I.L.M. at 1010:
The Court may exercise itsjurisdiction if one or more of the following States
are Parties to this Statute...
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for jurisdiction ratione personae over natural persons only (thereby ex-
cluding organizations or States). 134
The United States, the most vocal and powerful opponent of the
ICC, has stated its opposition to the Article 15 authorization of the
prosecutor "to initiate investigations and prosecutions" without a re-
ferral from a State Party or the Security Council. 135 In other words,
the lack of an external political check on the prosecutor's powers to
investigate and prosecute is a significant impediment to ratification in
some nations, including the United States.' 3 6 Indeed, it seems appro-
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or,
if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registra-
tion of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
Id. Therefore, the court would still be unable to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed within the territory of a non-state party by that state's own nationals
134 Id. art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 1003; see also id. art 25(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1016. The Stat-
ute does not permit trials in absentia. Thus, the court must always have the defendant
in its custody to obtain personal jurisdiction, in the sense that U.S. lawyers use the
term. Id. art. 63(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1037.
135 See Scheffer, supra note 124, at 12-13, 18.
Under Article 12, the ICC may exercise such jurisdiction over anyone any-
where in the world, even in the absence of a referral by the Security Council,
if either the state of the territory where the crime was committed or the state
of the nationality of the accused consents. Ironically, the treaty exposes non
parties in ways that parties are not exposed .... It is simply and logically
untenable to expose the largest deployed military force in the world, sta-
tioned across the globe to help maintain international peace and security
and to defend U.S. allies and friends, to the jurisdiction of a criminal court
the U.S. Government has not yet joined and whose authority over U.S. citi-
zens the United States does not yet recognize.
Id. at 18; see also Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?:
Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. ;on Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
105th Cong. 129 (1998) (statement of David L. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation) (expressing concerns regarding
the proposal for a proprio motu prosecutor).
136 The Rome Statute contains a complex procedure by which a pre-trial chamber
is to supervise cases in which the prosecutor exercises his or her investigatory powers.
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1029. The Prosecutor may com-
mence an investigation only if the pre-trial chamber has determined that a "reasona-
ble basis" exists to initiate the investigation. Id. art. 15(3), (4), 37 I.L.M. at 1011.
Reasonable basis is not defined in the statute, but Article 53 suggests that a finding of
reasonable basis has three elements: (1) there is a reasonable basis to believe that a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; (2) the
case is or would be admissible under Article 17; (3) the investigation serves the inter-
ests ofjustice, taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interest of victims.
See id. art. 53, 37 I.L.M. at 1029-30. In addition to considering the admissibility of a
case under Article 17 and the interests of justice, the Prosecutor should consider
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priate to call the Court's prosecutor an international independent
prosecutor precisely because he or she will be largely unchecked by a
political process in making the decision to prosecute a particular
case.' 37 This is a significant concern to Americans, who see concen-
tration of power, without a significant check, as a threat to liberty.13 8
The focal point for the debate over the relationship of the ICC to
national courts and/or governments is the Rome Statute's doctrine of
"complementarity." 139 This is a new doctrine in international law,' 40
whether there is "a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons
under article 58." Id. art. 53(2) (a), 37 I.L.M. at 1029. If a State or the Security Coun-
cil refers a situation, however, the Prosecutor will initiate an investigation pursuant to
article 53, unless there is no reasonable basis to proceed under the Statute. Id. art.
53(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1029. The Statute permits the pre-trial chamber to order an inves-
tigation or prosecution to proceed if the Prosecutor's decision is based solely on a
determination that the prosecution would not serve the interests of justice. Id. art.
53(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1029.
137 Symposium, Toward an International Criminal Court? A Debate, 14 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 159, 164-65 (2000).
[T]his Statute of Rome creates not just a court, but it creates an enormous,
potentially enormous, source of executive power: the prosecutor, just kind
of out there in the international environment. Beyond control. Certainly
beyond control of the United States and not part of any ordered structure of
accountability. This is the kind of creation of authority that, I think, a free
people should find unacceptable. This is not a passive court, moreover, like
the International Court ofJustice, but, particularly in the form of the prose-
cutor, a potentially very powerful actor.
Id. (noting the comments of John Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise
Institute). Bolton went on to explain: "This court is just kind of an arm and a leg out
there. It's not part of a coherent constitutional structure. It's subject to no popular
accountability-the prosecutor isn't. There are no structures that give me faith, as a
free person, that it's authority won't be abused." Id. at 188. The editorial page of the
Wall Street Journal characterized the entire court as the equivalent of a "global spe-
cial prosecutor," with no checks on its power whatsoever. Editorial, A Global Special
Prosecutor?, WALL ST.J., May 7, 2002, at A26; see also William F.Jasper, The International
Criminal Court: A Monster in the Making, CATH. FAM. NEWS, Apr. 2002, at 25 ("Here
again you see one of the violations of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers. We have the executive-the prosecutor-acting as part of the court.").
138 See David P. Schippers, Ethics in Government, MINDSZENTY REP., Aug. 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.mindszenty.org/report ("Anyone who reads the accounts of
the Constitutional Convention-the actual minutes of the Constitutional Convention
in 1787-will see that there is one idea that flows throughout the entire Convention
and it is this: men in power cannot be trusted with that power.").
139 The origin of the term "complementarity" may be traced to the Preamble of
the ILC Draft Statute, which provided that the ICC was "intended to be complemen-
tary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not
be available or may be ineffective." Report of the International Law Commission, supra
note 113, pmbl. A complete "legislative history" of the idea of complementarity may
be found in an article written byJohn T. Holmes, acting head of the Canadian delega-
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and it is the cornerstone of the ICC in world affairs.1 4' Simply put,
the ICC will take jurisdiction over, and prosecute, individuals who
have committed crimes within the Rome Statute where national juris-
dictions are "unable or unwilling' to act.14 2 Thus, the ICC is intended
to make clear that a purely juridical model is the only appropriate
method for dealing with human rights violations. From the point of
view of the people constructing the institution, the only remedy for
such violations is prosecution, either locally or in an international tri-
bunal; no other solution apparently received much attention. 1 43
tion to the Preparatory Commission for the establishment of the ICC, and the head of
the ad hoc committee on complementarity at the Rome Conference, in charge of
defining the concept. John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 13, at 41 passim. Mr. Holmes, in his introductory
comments, calls the relationship between the ICC and national courts "fundamental,"
but notes that "[d] efining the precise nature of this relationship was both politically
sensitive and legally complex." Id. at 41.
140 Webster's dictionary defines "complementarity" as "the interrelationship or the
completion or perfection brought about by the interrelationship of one or more units
supplementing, being dependent upon, or standing in polar position to another unit
or other units." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 464 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986). Complementarity is a familiar concept in
physics where it refers, for example, to the finding that light can be both particle and
wave. The psychological version of complementarity proposes that there are four dif-
ferent theoretical perspectives or grounds for studying psychological, behavioral, and
social phenomena. One ground is taken from physical science and deals with psy-
chological phenomena as physical phenomena, a second is grounded in biological
systems, a third in social systems, and a fourth in values, meaning, and purpose. Jo-
seph F. Rychlak, A Suggested Principle of Complementarity for Psychology, 48 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 933, 933-41 (1993).
141 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the
International Criminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 29, at 57, 67. The Tenth Preambular Paragraph of the Rome Statute pro-
claims that "the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute, supra note 6,
pmbl., 37 I.L.M. at 1002. Article 1 of the ICC Statute mentions the principle of com-
plementarity as one of the cornerstones of the ICC regime. Id. art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at
1003.
142 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1012 (emphasis added).
143 For example,John T. Holmes, the Canadian diplomat in charge of the negotia-
tions over the meaning of the term, does not cite any substantive discussion of truth
commissions such as in South Africa in his article detailing the evolution of the con-
tours of complementarity at the .Rome Conference. See Holmes, supra note 139, at
41-78. For additional information on the disputes regarding complementarity in the
early stages of the deliberations, see Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22,
153-78, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996); see also Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two
Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
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"Complementarity" in the Rome Statute denotes "a secondary
role-not in importance but in the sequence of events." 144 In other
words, national courts have the first right and obligation to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes; and, because ICC jurisdiction is
complementary to national courts, ICC jurisdiction can only be in-
voked if the national court is unwilling or unable to prosecute. 145 The
complementarity principle is intended to permit the Court to step in
when a person visits human rights crimes upon innocents, and the
relevant country is powerless for one reason or another to deal judi-
cially with the matter. There is, however, great potential for abuse of
the Court's jurisdiction, due to the fact that the decision as to whether
a state is "unwilling or unable" to conduct a meaningful trial will ulti-
mately not be made by that state, but rather by the ICC.
The Court will have to consider whether there has been undue de-
lay in the state-initiated prosecution indicative of a lack of a genuine
intention to proceed, or whether the domestic case is conducted
independently and impartially, consistent with the expressed inten-
tion to bring the person to justice. In other words, is the State act-
ing in good faith? This is not a standard issue in criminal cases. It is
a highly complex and litigious jurisdictional matter that could
nearly paralyze the Court, especially in its early years. 146
Court, 91 Am.J. INT'L L. 177, 181 (1997) (describing the two basic approaches of the
various delegations to the principle of complementarity).
144 The view that the concept of complementarity should not create a presump-
tion in favor of the jurisdiction of national courts and that the ICC should, on the
contrary, be given primary jurisdiction was expressed and rejected during negotia-
tions. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, 32, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
145 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1012; see alsoJohan D. van
der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 EM-
ORY INT'L L. Rv. 1, 67-68 (2000) ("Initially, some delegations in the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee and Preparatory Committee lamented the fact that complementarity was included
in the Preamble, because they believed that it afforded to the principle of comple-
mentarity too great a significance."). The International Criminal Tribunals for both
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda proceeded on the contrary assumption, namely
that their jurisdiction enjoyed precedence over that of national courts. Statute of the
International Tribunal (as amended May 17, 2002), 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1194 (1993),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm, adopted by S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. 2/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M.
1203 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 8(2) (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1602, 1605 (1994), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/stat-
ute.html, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3 (1994),
U.N. Doc. S/Res/95 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1600 (1994).
146 Louise Arbour & Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Over-
reach, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 29, at 129,
131.
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The ICC will not simply accept the state's assurance that it can
handle the case. 14 7 "The Court is required to examine whether, de-
spite the state's assertion that it can successfully manage the domestic
processing, that state is unable to obtain the accused, or the evidence,
or otherwise to carry out the proceedings."' 48 The Preparatory Com-
mittee's Report of 1996 recorded some concerns in this regard:
It was noted that while the determination of "availability" of na-
tional criminal systems was more factual, the determination of
whether such a system was "ineffective" was too subjective. Such a
determination would place the Court in the position of passing
judgement on the penal system of a State. That would impinge on
the sovereignty of national legal systems and might be embarrassing
to that State to the extent that it might impede its eventual coopera-
tion with the Court.1
49
The principle of complementarity cannot avoid this problem, but
many supporters of the ICC suggest that a court of limited jurisdiction
will not pose a threat to national sovereignty.1 50 This contention mer-
its further 'scrutiny.
147 Indeed, the Canadian diplomat who led the negotiations over complementar-
ity at the Rome Conference noted with startling candor in his legislative history of
complementarity that
[t]he Statute's provisions on complementarity are intended to refer to crimi-
nal investigations. Thus, where no such investigation occurred, the Court
would be free to act. A truth commission and the amnesties it provides may
not meet the test of a criminal investigation, since the simple telling of the
truth to a non-judicial body may convey an individual immunity from na-
tional prosecution. Whether it is good that the Court seemingly is able to
conduct its own investigations and prosecutions in these cases and what will
be the effect on future national reconciliation efforts are beyond the pur-
view of this article. However, it should be noted that the Prosecutor does
have some discretion in these matters.
Holmes, supra note 139, at 77.
148 Id.
149 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, supra note 143, 1 161.
150 "The principle of complementarity says that if a nation is worried about having
its people called before the International Criminal Court, it need only investigate
them conscientiously itself and if appropriate, prosecute them. That is an absolute
defense to any prosecution by the ICC." Symposium, supra note 137, at 171 (noting
the comments of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch). The
treaty also commands that the court is to exercise its jurisdiction only in cases involv-
ing "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole."
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1003; see also id. art. 1., 37 I.L.M. at
1003 (granting the Court "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern").
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C. The Threat to National Sovereignty
Complementarity will force nation states to change their domes-
tic substantive criminal laws. 15 1 As one supporter of the ICC has ex-
plained, in order to convince the ICC that it is willing and able to
prosecute those crimes that are defined in the Rome Statute, a state
may need to adopt its own laws prohibiting those crimes. 152
States may need to introduce new criminal laws, proscribing geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, if they do not have
such laws already. The simplest approach is to adopt the definitions
of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, States
may wish to go beyond these definitions, and give their courts juris-
diction over other international crimes as well.
153
Moreover, as the ICC decides its initial cases and begins to de-
velop a common law of what constitutes effective and acceptable na-
tional trials, states will be forced to follow those precedents or risk
having their defendants retried before the ICC. State grants of am-
nesty or pardons are unlikely to be effective.
154
Americans have seen a federal court system, of supposed limited
jurisdiction, grow dramatically over the past forty years. There is every
reason to think that the ICC will receive similar pressure to expand, 155
and nations that are concerned about their sovereignty are likely to be
left without persuasive arguments. 56 "This is because the comple-
151 SeeJennifer Schnese, Trends Emerging in Implementation of the ICC Statute, INT'L
CrM. CT. MONITOR, Nov. 2000, at 18 (reporting that Hans-Peter Kaul of the German
Foreign Ministry and head of the German delegation to the Preparatory Commission
noted that the ICC might serve to harmonize national criminal laws among the
States).
152 Joanne Lee, Ratifying and Implementing the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT. MONI-
TOR, Nov. 2000, at 3.
153 Id. Note the assumption that a state will be unable to prosecute aggression.
154 Davenport, supra note 22, at 14 (noting that "[m]any of the high expectations
for the International Criminal Court cannot be realized without an active
prosecutorial agenda").
155 At the first Preparatory Committee meeting following the events of September
11, 2001, a motion was made to include terrorism within the ICC's jurisdiction.
There have also been pressures to include international drug dealing within the
Court. Davenport, supra note 22, at 6. According to at least one observer, expansion
of the Court's jurisdiction was in mind at the time that the Rome Statute was negoti-
ated. SeeJasper, supra note 137, at 24. The head of the World Federalist Association
kept telling activists: "now just hold off, we just have to get this treaty through. We
have to get it established. We can always add the other crimes later." Id.; see also
Davenport, supra note 22, at 18 (describing the "structural means by which the
Court's scope is likely to be significantly expanded beyond its core purposes").
156 Some commentators already feel that the complementarity doctrine makes it
too hard to bring a case before the ICC. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN THE BAL-
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
mentarity doctrine is based strictly on political will; it does not rest
upon a moral basis" nor does it rest upon the idea of service that un-
derlies the doctrine of subsidiarity; "[t]hus, when it seems appropri-
ate, and political will shifts, there will be no principled basis on which
to oppose expansion of the ICC's jurisdiction." 157
The doctrine of complementarity precludes a case-by-case politi-
cal solution to the grave moral problems left in the wake of human
rights violations. Indeed, it is more than an academic exercise to ask
how the situation in South Africa would be different today if the ICC
had been a functioning international institution and the Rome Stat-
ute applied. Would it have been possible not to prosecute the
Afrikaaner perpetrators of apartheid, 158 particularly high-ranking gov-
ernment officials? Would South Africa be better off today if prosecu-
tions had occurred? Even more complicated is the situation of
Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Would Chile have been better off with a
prosecution conducted by an international body? Would Pinochet
ever have relinquished power in the face of such a threat? Whether
these questions were considered in detail during the negotiations
leading up to the Court's establishment is unclear. What is clear from
the document itself is that the Rome Statute commits the world to one
and only one solution to the problem of human rights violations: pros-
ecution on the Nuremberg model.
In negotiating the Rome Statute, the world community seems not
to have discussed in any meaningful way whether a criminal prosecu-
tion model truly is a "one size fits all" solution to all future instances of
human rights violations, particularly those where a nation is in transi-
tion from a tyranny to democracy.159 This potentially disastrous situa-
tion is the result of a misunderstanding of the proper role of law and
its limits as an instrument for fostering the common good, coupled
with a faulty understanding of the origin and role of human rights.
The experience of the past century teaches that flawed political mod-
els pursued with passion and zeal-even if constructed with the best
of intentions based upon the highest of ideals-can lead to the need-
less effusion of the blood of innocents. In what follows, we attempt to
fill the lacunae in the theory underpinning the ICC as an institution
ANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTrIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT 69-94 (1998).
157 Rychlak & Czarnetzky, supra note 5, at 130.
158 Apartheid is one of the defined crimes in the Rome Statute. Rome Statute,
supra note 6, art. 7(l)(j), 37 I.L.M. at 1005.
159 Similarly, in a domestic case, it might be illegal for police officers or firefight-
ers to strike, but following a resolution of the labor stoppage, it is unlikely that crimi-
nal prosecutions would be the best next move.
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and suggest ways that the practical problems with the Court might be
ameliorated before it is too late.
III. JUSTICE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
The possibility of an international legal order with the power to
punish and deter evil actions has never been so near reality as it is
today. The effort, of course, has been to establish an institution that
will lead the fight for a world where human rights are respected and
where punishment is just and swift for those who refuse to live hu-
manely. The ordering of human affairs, however, requires more than
good intentions. Such an endeavor requires a realistic view of the na-
ture of human beings as complete persons-that is, both as individu-
als and as members of communities-and a moral commitment to the
common good. Unfortunately, one of the ICC's greatest weaknesses is
that it does not take such a view.
A. The Role of Law injustice
Human beings are born into and become part of different "com-
munities." The first and most basic community is the family, which is
the institution primarily responsible for the development of the indi-
vidual and his or her potential. 160 People also become, either volunta-
rily or by happenstance, part of other institutions that contribute to
the development of the person. Communities are groups of individu-
als who hold something in common, be it political views, religious be-
liefs, or business interests. 16 1 Most human beings are members
simultaneously of several different communities, beginning with a
family and nation and perhaps including a corporation or other em-
ployer, a church, or one or more civic or social clubs. 162 Members of
160 See BERNARD YACK, THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL ANIMAL: COMMUNITY, JUSTICE,
AND CONFLICT IN ARISTOTELIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 27-33 (1993).
161 For a discussion of these and other types of communities, and their treatment
by Aristotle, see id. at 29-33. Aristotle, of course, held that "the highest good for man
is found not in the political life, nor in any other form of practical activity, but in
theoretical inquiry and contemplation of truth." DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 22
(Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1960).
162 See generally WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EAST-
ERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT 32 (1980) (noting that "Aristotle regarded the family as
the basic unit of the state, and the state as a creation of nature, since in isolation man
is not self sufficient"); YACK, supra note 160, at 29-33 (describing four key features of
Aristotle's conception of community).
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such communities coordinate their activities over time through inter-
action with others in the group "with a view to a shared objective."1 63
Taking these insights seriously, legal theorists increasingly recog-
nize that an international "community," which transcends traditional
nation states, ethnic groups, and clans, might be necessary to secure
fully the "common good" of all human beings.1 64 If nation states are
incomplete communities, then other nation states and, perhaps, inter-
national organizations must assist nation states in coordinating their
activities in order to foster the common good of their citizens. 165 This
begs the question, however: When is it appropriate for a larger com-
munity to step in and direct the activities of a smaller community?
Specifically, in this instance, when ought an international tribunal
have exclusive and/or superior jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
mitted within a particular country?
The problem begins with the relationship between politics and
justice. In a family, each member contributes to the good of the col-
lective and, by easing the burdens of life on its members, the collec-
tive permits each member to flourish and develop. a66 In a larger
context, however, families are incapable, by themselves, of perfectly
securing the good. Thus, families associate with other families to
163 YACK, supra note 160, at 153. According to Aristotle, the political community is
primary among other types of communities because its end is to promote the good
life of its individual members, and hence the common good of the political commu-
nity itself. ARISTOLTE, Politics 1252b30, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1129 (Rich-
ard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941). Aristotle explains that it is the
human being's ability to express reason through speech that makes humans naturally
form such political communities, and distinguishes such communities from those of
other animals such as bees. Id. 1253a, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, at
1129-30. He even goes so far as to say that an individual who by nature has no state is
either "a bad man or a god," because of man's nature as "a political animal." Id.
1252b25-1253b5, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, at 1129-30.
164 ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 235 (1999) ("Natural law the-
orists are coming to view the territorial or national state as crucially 'incomplete,' that
is to say, incapable of doing all that can and must be done to secure conditions for the
all-round flourishing of its citizens.").
165 Id. at 235. Professor George agrees with Professor Finnis:
If it now appears that the good of individuals can only be fully secured and
realized in the context of international community, we must conclude that
the claim of the national state to be a complete community is unwarranted
and the postulate of the national legal order, that it is supreme and compre-
hensive and an exclusive source of legal obligation, is increasingly what law-
yers would call a 'legal fiction.'
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 150 (1980).
166 See generally JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, LoVE & ECONOMICS: WHY THE LAISSEZ-
FAMiE FAMILY DOESN'T WORK (2001).
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form local bodies politic that result in villages and towns. 167 Local
bodies politic then form together through increasingly large associa-
tions to form a national body politic. The national body politic may
establish a nation state. At each level, the goal of the polity is the
common good, which is both an end and a means. 168 It is an end in
the sense that it is directed to the enrichment of the individuals within
the polity, and a means by which individuals achieve all other goods-
including the design of the polity. 169
Legalistic justice is not superior to the common good, nor is it
congruent with the common good; rather, it is a component, albeit an
extremely important one, of the common good. 170 Jacques Maritain
put the matter thus:
If the person has the opportunity of being treated as a person in
social life, and if the unpleasant works which this life imposes can
be made easy and happy and even exalting, it is first of all due to the
development of law and to institutions of law. But it is also and
indispensably due to the development of civic friendship, with the
confidence and mutual devotion this implies on the part of those
who carry it out. For the true city of human rights, fraternity is not
a privilege of nature which flows from the natural goodness of nian
and which the State need only proclaim. It is the end of a slow and
difficult conquest which demands virtue and sacrifice and a perpet-
ual victory of man over himself. In this sense, we can say that the
167 Of course, individuals form associations with goals other than the purely politi-
cal-sports and leisure clubs, debating societies, fraternal organizations, religious
groups, etc. What unites these groups is that they are directed at the common, recip-
rocal good of their individual members and of the collective.
168 For an excellent summary of different theories of the common good, see
MICHAEL NOVAK, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1989). For discussions of
the concept of the "common good" from a theological standpoint, and the interplay
of the "common good" with theories of justice, see Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Justice as
Right Relationship: A Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Affirmative Action, 27 PEPP.
L. REv. 377, 415-19, 448-52 (2000); and RobertJ. Araujo, S.J., The Lawyer's Duty to
Promote the Common Good: The Virtuous Law Student and Teacher, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 83,
91-95 (1999).
169 JAMES V. SCHALL, JACQUES MARITAIN: THE PHILOSOPHER IN SOCIETY 204 (1998).
Legal theoristJohn Finnis, building upon these fundamental insights of the Aristote-
lian/Thomist tradition, suggests that justice is "an ensemble of requirements of prac-
tical reasonableness that hold because the human person must seek to realize and
respect human goods not merely in himself and for his own sake but also in common,
in community." FINNIS, supra note 165, at 161.
170 The desired common good, of course, is the good of persons, not of constructs
such as the "state." SCHALL, supra note 169, at 204. The state exists to serve the per-
son, not the other way around. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON
GoOD 49-51 (1972).
1
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heroic ideal towards which true political emancipation tends is the
inauguration of a fraternal city.' 17
By emphasizing civic friendship as crucial to and, indeed, a prerequi-
site for a society that truly respects human rights, Maritain is following
Aristotle and Aquinas and anticipating Desmond Tutu, each of whom
devote at least as much attention to the idea of civic friendship as to
legal justice in their political philosophies. 72
The key insight that flows from this observation is that reason can
suggest which aspects of social life are necessary for the common good
in the form of predefined legal norms (including human rights
norms). These legal norms (which we will refer to as "legal jus-
tice"'173) are not, however, sufficient to establish a society truly
founded on human rights. "[Legal] justice by itself, though noble, is a
cold and impersonal virtue."'174
This is not to denigrate the importance of legal justice. Legal
justice on the national and international levels most emphatically in-
cludes human rights norms, which are therefore vital to the calculus
of what constitutes the "good" of the nation. Since at least the time of
Aristotle, however, philosophers have held that legal justice alone is
insufficient. 175 What is necessary for a just society is for people to
choose to live together in civic friendship in a body politic, regulated
by just laws that are subject to political checks and balances. 176
Rather than seeking to develop comprehensive lists of legal
norms that are then simply translated into positive laws to be enforced
by courts, Aristotle held a political concept of justice.177 This concept
171 JACQUES MARITAIN, The Conquest of Freedom, in THE EDUCATION OF MAN: THE
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN 159, 172-73 (Donald Gallagher &
Idella Gallagher eds., 1962). It is at this very point that ProfessorJudith Shklar's theo-
ries regarding legalism and the common law tradition meet. See SHK.AR, supra note
18, at 113-23.
172 See SCHALL, supra note 169, at 142 (regarding Aristotle and Aquinas); TUTU,
supra note 83, at 30-32, 54-56 (describing Archbishop Tutu's definition of ubuntu
and its importance as a theory of justice different from purely legal or corrective
justice).
173 SeeYACK, supra note 160, at 130-31 (identifying such an approach to justice as
a "legalistic or adjudicatory" approach to justice, which is common to much of mod-
ern political philosophy).
174 See SCHALL, supra note 169, at 142.
175 Jacques Maritain, for example, asserted that true justice requires a recognition
of individuals in their concrete reality, and it includes the classic and intertwined
notions of general and distributive justice. Id. at 145.
176 Nemo nisi per amicitiam intelligitur, runs the ancient proverb: "no one is under-
stood except through friendship." SeeJACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND STATE 202 (1951).
177 ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics 1129a1-1 137a31, in THE BASIC Woms OF ARIS-
TOTLE, supra note 163, at 1002-19; seeYACK, supra note 160, at 131 ("I suggest that ' .
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is rooted in his view of politics, 178 which in turn leads him to examine
the nature of human friendship. According to Aristotle, "Friendship
seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it
than forjustice... when men are friends they have no need ofjustice,
while when they are just they need friendship as well .... 179
According to Aristotle's political philosophy, members of the
body politic are not friends in the sense of being "brothers or com-
rades," but neither are they simply self-interested parties joined to-
gether in a mutual contract. Rather, the friendship that is
characteristic of citizens in civic life is between these two extremes and
ultimately is determined by the parties' desires. Thus, political friend-
ship is a "shared advantage friendship" which permits individuals to
come together to promote their good because each cannot flourish
alone. 180
Civic friendship has been established mainly in accordance with
utility; for men seem to have come together because each is not
sufficient for himself, though they would have come together any-
how for the sake of living in company.... The justice belonging to
the friendship of those useful to one another is pre-eminentlyjus-
tice, for it is .. .political justice. 18 1
Accordingly, Aristotle identifies justice in general with acts in-
tended to promote the common advantage of the community, not
simple adherence to the law. The fair and the lawful "are different as
a part is from its whole (for all that is unfair is unlawful, but not all
that is unlawful is unfair) .... 2
As the preeminent form of justice, general justice requires that
legalistic or corrective justice, with its defined norms of fairness, must
sometimes give way to other aspects of the common good. Familiar
examples are parole or pardon of violent criminals, or offering a plea
bargain to one murderer in order to prosecute others. Less familiar,
but important when discussing an international common good, is the
Aristotle rejects the legalist understanding of justice .... In its place he develops a
much more explicitly political understanding of justice than we find in most philo-
sophic theories."); REESE, supra note 162, at 274 (providing definitions of justice
based upon the writings of Aristotle, Plato, Locke, and Aquinas).
178 Aristotle understood politics to be "the means by which we identify the chang-
ing and often conflicting standards of justice that guide us in political life." YACK,
supra note 160, at 132.
179 ARISTOTLE 1155a22-27, supra note 177, at 1058-59.
180 YACK, supra note 160, at 110-11.
181 ARISTOTLE, Eudaemion Ethics 1242a6-13, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARIS-
TOTLE 1922 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,J. Solomon trans., 1984).
182 ARISTOTLE 1130b10-11, supra note 177, at 1005.
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interest of the body politic in personal and national security, individ-
ual freedom, and civil peace.
Aristotle's concept of general justice does not imply that there is
one defined state of affairs that the phildsopher could discover solely
by applying abstract reason to the community. Instead, the common
good of the community emerges from the dialectic between competing
conceptions of the good in society.' 8 3 For Aristotle, therefore, gen-
eral justice emerges primarily from politics (as he defined the
term), 18 4 as the identification of the common good in communities
only emerges from political exchange. 8 5 One commentator ex-
plained Aristotle's view of justice as
a distinctly political conception of justice, first of all, in its political
understanding of the common good, an understanding that reflects
the nature and intensity of the claims made by competing groups
within the political community. It is also distinctly political in that it
focuses on what people do with the power they gain in political
communities to shape the life of other individuals, not just on
whether or not they are faithful to basic standards of fairness. Aris-
totelian justice is not a pattern laid up in heaven, or anywhere else
for that matter. It is, instead, a disposition to do what we can to
promote the common advantage of competing individuals and
groups, a disposition that we use to measure the performance of
political actors.' 8 6
Such a view of justice means that justice in a particular commu-
nity in a certain situation might be highly indeterminate. In this case,
the only way to both rebuild the bonds of community and resolve the
183 See REESE, supra note 162, at 274 (offering Artistotle's concept ofjustice); YACK,
supra note 160, at 171 (stating that general justice represents a disposition to seek and
promote the common advantage of competing groups). One scholar explained the
problem with the way most people view a world government as follows:
When people talk about the ability of world government to control aggres-
sion, the analogy they usually use is the police versus the lone bank robber.
But the analogy with the firefighter's union or the IRA would be more ap-
propriate. Individual criminal acts are easy to deal with, organized political
acts much harder. The threat to peace in the world comes not from individ-
uals but from organized groups such as revisionist states, military factions,
and revolutionary parties.
ZIEGLER, supra note 52, at 129; see also INIs L. CLAUDE, JR., POWER AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 243-55 (1962) (arguing that the central task for world government would
be to find ways to deal with disruptive states as opposed to disruptive individuals).
Problems with a striking firefighter's union, of course, require political negotiation
and compromise far more often than they require criminal prosecution.
184 YACK, supra note 160, at 172.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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problem is through negotiation; there is no alternative to moral polit-
iCS. 1 8 7 "[A]ttempts to depoliticize political justice are doomed to fail-
ure ".... 188
B. Justice and the Structure of Government
A political, nonlegalistic view of justice leads naturally to certain
conclusions about the structure of government. In this regard, Jac-
ques Maritain was careful to distinguish between the "body politic"
and the "state." The body politic, or political society, is made up of
the various communities and families of a nation joined together for
the pursuit of the common good of the body politic and its individual
constituents. 18 9 The state, on the other hand, is the subsidiary part of
the body politic that is "especially concerned with the maintenance of
law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the
administration of public affairs." 190 As the part of the body politic
that specializes in promoting the common good of the entire body
politic, and the one that therefore has a monopoly on force, the state
is the lead instrument of the body politic, and is superior to its other
organs. 19' On the other hand, the state is not superior to the body
politic itself; rather, it is the agent "endowed with topmost authority
not by its own right and for its own sake, but only by virtue and to the
extent of the requirements of the common good .... -19 2 Thus, it is a
grave mistake to think of the state as having absorbed the body politic
entirely, or as the equivalent of a natural person with moral rights of
its own. 193
This view of the place of the state in the body politic leads to an
expansive view of appropriate structures of government, that are lim-
ited primarily by the duty to promote the common good of the body
politic that the government will serve. 194 The best government struc-
187 This is not to say that there can be no objective, transcendent truth. The point
is simply that justice in a given case might be better served by looking beyond tradi-
tional retributive justice (even though that might be, in the end, the best path to the
truth).
188 YACK, supra note 160, at 172. As previously noted, this political view ofjustice is
strikingly similar to the traditional African concept of ubuntu. See Mokgoro, supra
note 83, at 15-16.
189 MARITAIN, supra note 176, at 10-11.
190 Id. at 12.
191 Id. at 12-13.
192 Id. at 13.
193 Id. at 13-14.
194 For a detailed discussion of the legitimacy and authority of government, see
FINNIS, supra note 165, at 245-54.
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ture in any particular case depends upon numerous factors-e.g., lo-
cal customs, culture, climate, history, etc.-and thus a wide range of
potentially legitimate government structures promoting the common
good is possible. It is through the application of practical reasoning
about the best way to promote the common good in a particular body
politic that the state is formed, in a process that is often much more
art than science in the face of complex political situations.195
A valid governmental structure must not impinge upon any of the
natural goods which are crucial to the common good of the body poli-
tic and its organs. Thus, such fundamental human goods as individ-
ual liberty must be respected, either in the structure of the
government itself through a constitution or through some other
means, in order for the state properly to serve the common good.
What emerges from a political view of justice, therefore, is that
political reasoning, tempered by morality and practicality, is the best
path to the establishment of legitimate government structures dedi-
cated to the common good of the body politic. There cannot be a
"one-size-fits-all" solution, at least not without sacrificing some aspect
of the good of a particular body politic. Moreover, a legitimate gov-
ernment dedicated to the common good cannot be thrust upon a
body politic-either by extraneous "law" or outside political influ-
ence. On the contrary, the state must emerge from the body politic
itself.
C. Making Room for "Political Forgiveness"
Adherents to a legalistic view of justice would, naturally, find the
foregoing discussion odd at best. If obeying laws is the sum of one's
moral duties, then there is no relationship between civic friendship
and justice-justice means simply enforcing the laws. If, however, one
rejects such a view, then alternative paths to justice must be possible.
Indeed, in order to secure a central role for law in a society wracked
by political chaos, political solutions might be superior to legalistic
ones. As one scholar has noted:
Sometimes... the values to be secured by the genuine Rule of Law
and authentic constitutional government are best served by depart-
ing, temporarily but perhaps drastically, from the law and the con-
stitution. Since such occasions call for that awesome responsibility
195 An excellent example of precisely this sort of process is the practical statesman-
ship that took place in Philadelphia at the Constitutional Convention. See generally
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONsTrru-
TIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 (1986) (detailing the compromises
made at the Constitutional Convention by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution).
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and most measured practical reasonableness which we call states-
manship, one should say nothing that might appear to be a "key" to
identifying the occasion or a "guide" to acting in it. 19 6
Spurred in part by the recent experiences of countries such as
South Africa, philosophers have begun to explore settlements arrived
at through political compromise to understand the alternatives to ven-
geance or prosecution. Particularly intriguing is the search for a via
media between victor's justice and amnesia, which in turn has led to an
examination of the relationship between justice and forgiveness in
politics. 197 Professor P.E. Digeser's study of "political forgiveness," for
example, rejects the view that legal or "rectificatory" justice is "com-
plete"justice that "trump[s] all other concerns." 198 Rather, if the ap-
propriate conditions exist, then the statesman might seek an
alternative that takes into account the true nature of actual human
beings living together in community in crafting a just solution to the
type of intractable injustices that are common in transitional societies.
In situations where injustice is intractable, and legalistic solutions are
not feasible, there is an opening for what Digeser calls political for-
giveness, which "can be understood as an action that forgives a debt,
reconciles the past, and invites the restoration of the civil and moral
equality of transgressors and their victims .... 199
196 FINNIS, supra note 165, at 275. Finnis goes on to state that in such situations,
the statesman's duty is then to act "for the sake of the standing needs of the good of
persons in community-from the sheer fact of power, of opportunity to affect, for
good, the common life." Id.
197 See, e.g., P.E. DIGESER, POLITICAL FORGIVENESS (2001); MARTHA MINoW, BE-
TWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIO-
LENCE (1998); DONALD W. SHRIVER, AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS
(1995).
198 DIGESER, supra note 197, at 208. Digeser defines "political forgiveness"
through a series of conditions necessary for its exercise:
(1) the existence of a relationship between at least two parties in which (2)
there is a debt owed to one party by the other (3) that is relieved by a party
with appropriate standing (4) conveying the appropriate signs or utterances
in which (5) the success of the act does not depend on the emotional state
or internal states of the forgivers, (6) even though it is generally thought
good to receive what is due because (7) the effects of settling the past and
inviting restoration of the offender or the debtor is somehow also thought to
be good.
Id. at 207.
199 Id. at 28. This is, in part, exactly what criminal punishment in a stable body
politic also seeks to do-"[p]unishment .... characteristically seeks to restore the
distributively just balance of advantages between the criminal and the law-abiding, so
that ... no one should actually have been disadvantaged... by choosing to remain
within the confines of the law." FINNIS, supra note 165, at 263. See generally Ronald J.
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Political forgiveness is an important tool of justice in human af-
fairs because in some instances other human goods override the pur-
suit of legal justice, and because injustice is indeed often
intractable.200 In such circumstances, political forgiveness is a path to
a more general justice in which other goods can be realized. In the
case of nations in transition, those goods might include peace and
stability, the establishment of a just society, an accurate accounting of
the human costs of a nation's recent struggle, the society's sense of
political "repose" in the wake of a final settlement, and similar
matters.
The concept of political forgiveness raises a number of questions
that must be answered not just in theory, but also in practice. Perhaps
the most important question is: when is it appropriate for a successor
government to forgive the criminal actions of its predecessor? One
answer to this question lies in Jacques Maritain's distinction between
the state and the body politic. 20 1 When the state commits crimes
against citizens-and therefore against the common good of the body
politic-the state acts illegitimately and should be held to account,
even if that means being replaced. In other words, it is the good of
the body politic and its individual members that has been harmed,
and the body politic is responsible for the remedies. 20 2 If the succes-
sor state is the legitimate representative of the body politic, then that
state has standing to administer justice against wrongdoers in the for-
mer regime. Such justice might include, if appropriate, political
forgiveness. 20
These questions can only be answered definitively in the real
world. There is no guidebook for the statesman facing the question of
the nature of justice, and thus the common good of his or her body
politic, in times of political upheaval. The crucial task for scholars is
perhaps not to write such a guidebook, but to help those persons
identify paths to the common good, and, most importantly, to ensure
Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of
Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1990) (arguing that society is justified in punishing
offenders who violate the rules that society has used to identify itself, and that such
punishment is a social good because it is a deterrent and it reinforces societal values).
Of course, in other political contexts, considerations such as peace and order in soci-
ety intrude to significantly occlude the proper path to these goals.
200 DIGESER, supra note 197, at 208-09.
201 See supra notes 189-97.
202 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 239-49 (1999) [hereinafter LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT]; JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 3-6 (1999) [here-
inafter DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION].
203 Presumably, this would be most successful where innocent victims would also
benefit from this forgiveness.
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that political institutions do not preclude a nation from taking the
right one.
D. The Vision for International Criminal Law and Its Limits
The discussion of political theory to this point sets the stage for
understanding the nature (and thus the proper role) of international
criminal law. To begin with the words of its architects, the primary
goal of international criminal law is and ought to be the promotion
of peace through international cooperation. 20 4 In translating this
goal into law, it is no surprise that the crimes defined in the Rome
Statute are all traceable to one or more rights defined by the various
human rights instruments which have been signed over the past half
century. 20 5 Despite the nearly universal agreement among nations
concerning the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other covenants, there is far from universal accord
surrounding the source of those rights.20 6 When all of the rights
204 The Preamble to the Rome Statute makes this precise point in enumerating
the reasons for establishing an international criminal court:
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures
pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mo-
saic may be shattered at any time,
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-be-
ing of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecu-
tion must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by
enhancing international cooperation ....
Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl., 37 I.L.M. at 1002.
205 These instruments include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights; and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, to name the most prominent and widely accepted instruments. SeeJack Don-
nelly, Ethics and International Human Rights, in ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:
EXTENT AND LIMITS 128, 131 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Daniel Warner eds., 2001).
206 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Donnelly, supra note 205, at 132.
The Universal Declaration affirms in its first article that "[a]ll human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights," thus clearly laying down the 'principle that
human beings-all human beings-are entitled to enjoy these rights simply because
they are human. One of the participants in the negotiations that resulted in the Uni-
versal Declaration, Jacques Maritain, stated that "[y]es, we agree about the rights but
on condition no one asks us why." See MARY ANN GLENDON, WORLD MADE ANEW: ELEA-
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found in the Universal Declaration and the covenants are collected
together, they form a long litany of political, social and economic
rights, including, inter alia: the right to life and liberty; protection
against slavery, torture, and inhumane punishment; equal protection
of the law; and protection of privacy, family, and home.20 7
The corpus of internationally recognized human rights evinces a
view of the human being as neither radically autonomous-alone in a
cruel and uncaring world-nor as merely a meaningless cog com-
pletely subsumed by a greater whole. 208 Indeed, far from endorsing
either of the extreme theories of autonomous individuality or radical
communitarianism, the vision of the human person that emerges
from human rights texts, taken together, is that of an individual whose
inherent dignity as a human being entitles him or her to certain pro-
tections as an individual and as a member of society.20 9 Human rights
enumerated in various international agreements, therefore, reflect "a
particular understanding of the meaning of equal concern and re-
spect, based on a substantive conception of human dignity or the con-
ditions required to permit human flourishing," and therefore directed
at the common good.210 This last point is absolutely crucial: the goal
of all international human rights instruments is to define the condi-
tions that will best foster human potential and will, when imple-
mented, produce societies and institutions that can promote the
common good.211 With this understanding, the underlying philoso-
phy that drives the effort to establish the ICC comes into view.
The unprecedented international "statute" defining the crimes
within the ICC's jurisdiction is a translation of general human rights
norms into the language of criminal law.2 12 Those human rights
norms provide a blueprint for the common good of a community,
whether it is a single polity which makes up a modern nation state, or
some international body politic encompassing all human beings. Like
NOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77 (2001) (quot-
ing Jacques Maritain).
207 See Donnelly, supra note 205, at 132-33.
208 Id. at 135-36.
209 Id. at 135-37.
210 Id. at 136.
211 See id. at 137.
212 This is obvious simply from the names of the crimes: genocide, crime of aggres-
sion, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The legislative action involved in
drafting the Rome Statute is, therefore, an example of what Thomas Aquinas called a
detenninatio the legislator's attempt to translate a precept of "natural law" (e.g., "mur-
der is wrong") into positive law to help foster the common good (e.g., the Model
Penal Code's delineation of the elements of various types of homicide, see MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 210.0-210.4 (1985)).
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all criminals, the perpetrators of crimes defined by the Rome Statute
violate fundamental norms that must be observed if the common
good of the community is to be fostered. Like all criminals, they de-
serve punishment. Through the doctrine of complementarity and the
ideology of legalism that it embodies, the drafters of the Rome Statute
reveal their faith: zealous enforcement of human rights norms
through "international criminal law" is the path to ajust and peaceful
world.
A legalistic model of criminal justice, however, is not a sufficient
means of achieving the common good of a body politic. It is only
through moral politics that general justice emerges. Any effort to pro-
mote the common good solely through legalistic justice will yield at
best a cold form of justice that ignores the fact that human communi-
ties are bound together by civic friendship, without which human soci-
ety cannot exist. At worst, legal justice divorced from moral politics
will lead to the injustice that emerges when the common good of the
body politic is defined solely by what appears in positive legal rules.
E. The Possibility of World Government
Scholars working within the Aristotelian tradition have long rec-
ognized the necessity of the "world community" to foster the common
good of all people, over and above modem nation states and their
bodies politic. 213 Because nation states are self-evidently "imperfect"
societies that are not entirely capable of fostering the common good
of their members, it is up to the "world community" to step in where
appropriate to do so. 2 14
If it now appears that the good of individuals can only be fully se-
cured and realized in the context of international community, we
must conclude that the claim of the national state to be a complete
community is unwarranted and the postulate of the national legal
order, that it is supreme and comprehensive and an exclusive
source of legal obligation, is increasingly what lawyers would call a
"legal fiction."215
The focus for the world body politic must be to develop the politi-
cal institutions capable of dealing with modern problems such as nu-
clear war, environmental degradation, starvation, human rights
violations, etc. 2 16 The design of such institutions must proceed ac-
213 See FINNIS, supra note 165, at 150; GEORGE, supra note 164, at 234-35; MARI-
TAIN, supra note 176, at 188-216.
214 See GEORGE, supra note 164, at 234-35.
215 FINNIS, supra note 165, at 150.
216 GEORGE, supra note 164, at 236.
III
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cording to the dictates of practical reasoning and must emerge from
the body politic itself.
This last point is crucial: an effective world "state" cannot be su-
perimposed upon the current international system of nation states. In
commenting upon precisely this impulse-which he termed the
"merely governmental" theory of world government-Jacques Mari-
tain observed:
The quest of such a Superstate capping the nations is nothing else,
in fact, than the quest of the old utopia of a universal Empire. This
utopia was pursued in past ages in the form of the Empire of one
single nation over all others. The pursuit, in the modern age, of an
absolute World Superstate would be the pursuit of a democratic
multinational Empire, which would be no better than the others. 2 17
This approach to world government, with an over-arching authority
capable of resolving disputes is, however, quite seductive.2 18
What Maritain suggests in the place of the merely governmental
approach is the "fully political" theory of world organization. 2 19
Rather than imposing a world government, the effort should be to
form a world body politic from which such a government and such
institutions might emerge. There is no such world body politic at the
moment, and therefore it is premature to envision a true "world" gov-
ernment.2 20 Without a world body politic, international organizations
that purport to usurp the powers of inferior bodies politic must be
limited in scope, and must proceed only with the universal accord of
217 MAR1TAIN, supra note 176, at 204.
218 The argument for a universal kingdom or empire, with a single supreme au-
thority to settle quarrels among those beneath it, is at least as old as Dante's poem,
The Divine Comedy, and his book De Monarchia. See GEORGE H. SABINE & THOMAS L.
THORSON, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 243-48 (4th ed. 1973). The truth, how-
ever, is that many of the world's conflicts are civil wars, where there supposedly is a
single supreme authority. "If the prescription 'government' doesn't always work at
the national level, why should we be certain that it will work at the international
level?" ZIEGLER, supra note 52, at 130 (noting that "followers of the Bahli religion
believe in world government and describe how a 'world tribunal will adjudicate and
deliver its compulsory and final verdict in all and any disputes that may arise between
the various elements constituting this universal system'"); see also INIs L. CLAUDE, JR.,
SWORDS IrNo PLOWSHARES 424 (1971).
219 MARITAIN, supra note 176, at 204-05.
220 The United Nations does not perform this function. The General Assembly is
an assembly of states, each with one vote, and therefore does not accurately reflect the
world polity. The Security Council with its five permanent members and their veto
powers, is even less reflective of any world polity. Perhaps the United Nations repre-
sents a first step in the right direction, but it is far from an acceptable world governing
body, and thus should not be entrusted with prudential decisionmaking about the
.world common good."
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those inferior bodies. Indeed, Maritain predicted that any attempt to
establish world government without such universal accord would
"creat[e] a half-universality to be extended progressively to the whole,
[which] would, I am afraid, invite war rather than peace. 22 1 A world
government would be successful in promoting the common good
through justice only if all of the channels for doing so-moral, social,
political, etc.-were present along with courts of law. That, of course,
cannot take place until there is a true body politic.
IV. BLUEPRINT FOR AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Can there be an effective international criminal court? Perhaps,
but only if the proponents of such a court soberly acknowledge the
limits of a legalistic model in addressing the problem of gross viola-
tions of human rights. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, an
international court can be a significant instrument in a body politic's
search for the common good. This has been demonstrated over the
years by the several international ad hoc tribunals that have played
important roles in helping transitional societies achieve peace and de-
mocracy. It is no coincidence, however, that various political enti-
ties-nations, states within nations, municipalities, cantons, counties,
etc.-do not have only a criminal court in charge of vindicating the
common good. Beyond the things that such courts do very well (such
as finding facts, rendering judgments in individual cases, and deter-
ring crime by meting out justice), a criminal court is simply not well-
equipped to account for the other aspects of the common good of the
body politic.
A. Political Negotiations: The Sine Qua Non
Criminal law, which involves punishing people for violating civil
norms, is traditionally justified by utilitarian theories such as deter-
rence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, 222 as well as a retributive the-
221 MARITAIN, supra note 176, at 212.
222 See ROBERT H. BORIK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 121-23 (1990) (discussing the way society provides protection by requiring
compliance with its laws). These three effects of punishment on potential lawbreak-
ers are often identified as separate theories of punishment. See, e.g., J. KAPLAN & R.
WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 5-23 (1986). Hence, one commenta-
tor might advocate the deterrence theory of punishment, while another will advocate
the rehabilitative theory, while still a third writes of the incapacitation theory. In fact,
these effects exist regardless of the theory. Thus we may imprison someone in order
to deter others, but we will also "benefit" from the incapacitation effect. Rehabilita-
tion might require some additional effort on the part of the penal institution, but
essentially it is more appropriate to speak of these effects of punishment rather than
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ory which posits that punishment is justified because the wrongdoer is
morally culpable.223 Criminal penalties send utilitarian messages to
other potential lawbreakers that society will not countenance such ac-
tivity and will exact a penalty from lawbreakers (deterrence). 224 More-
over, if the criminal is removed from society, he or she will not be able
to commit further criminal acts, at least not on the public at large
(incapacitation). 225 Finally, by rehabilitating incarcerated criminals,
each as a separate theory. Nonetheless, much has been written about each of these
effects as separate theories of punishment. Thus, this discussion is limited to a rela-
tively short description of each effect and the potential problems it involves. See
Rychlak, supra note 199, at 308-14 (discussing and outlining various theories and
effects of punishment).
223 Retribution, to the extent it adds the requirement of guilt into the punishment
equation, must play an important part in any just criminal system. There is a need in
mankind to see that justice is done. Retribution is based on moral culpability. If the
criminal deserves punishment, it should be inflicted. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 164 (1975) ("We also want, or ought to want, sentences to give appro-
priate expression to our moral concern over the nature of the offense ...."). How-
ever, if the criminal is not morally culpable, no punishment is justified, regardless of
any potential good effect it may have on society. See, e.g., FROM THE FORTY Two TRADI-
TIONS OF AN-NAWAWI, reprinted in THE PORTABLE WORLD BIBLE 476 (Robert 0. Ballou
ed., 1976) ("Actions are to be judged only in accordance with intentions."); THE Ko-
RAN (E.H. Palmer trans.), in 45 HARVARD CLASSIcs 885, 990-91 (Charles W. Eliot ed.,
1910) (prescribing more severe retributive punishments for those who kill knowingly
than for those who kill by mistake). The utilitarian theories might justify punishment
"for the greater good of the greater number," regardless of moral blameworthiness,
but retribution does not justify punishment without moral culpability.
224 Aquinas said that "[i]t is not always through the perfect goodness of virtue that
one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment .. " 2 AQUINAS,
supra note 16, at 759. If you spank a child, you hope the child will not repeat the
wrongdoing. If you spank the child in front of his or her siblings, you hope all will be
deterred from committing the bad act in the future. Deterring the offender from
repeating the crime is known as specific deterrence, while deterring others is known
as general deterrence. See RobertJustin Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment,
40 FLA. L. REV. 17, 30 n.36 (1988) ("General deterrence theories are concerned with
punishment's effect on other people and on crime rates."); Rychlak, supra note 199,
at 309-10; see also United States v. O'Driscoll, 586 F. Supp. 1486, 1486 (D. Colo.
1984), affd, 761 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that sentencing is required to
deter others from committing the bad act in the future).
225 Under the incapacitation theory, one might compare imprisonment with quar-
antine. Regardless of any personal culpability, indeed even if the criminal is seen as
being ill, incarceration is appropriate, just as enforced isolation of a person with a
contagious disease might be justified. See Ferdinand D. Schoeman, On Incapacitating
the Dangerous, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 27 passim (1979), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 595
(Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed. 1980). Discounting crimes committed in
prison, this theory works by definition, assuming incapacitated criminals would other-
wise commit new crimes and assuming that they are not replaced on the streets by
new criminals. See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG,'PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY
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they will be prepared to reenter society as law-abiding citizens (reha-
bilitation) .226 Viewed this way, the utilitarian justifications for punish-
ment can all be seen as benefits to the general public. 227
Experience teaches that citizens sometimes are willing to forego
the traditional benefits that they may receive from criminal punish-
ment of wrongdoers if the common good dictates a different course of
action. This is the case particularly when some higher truth or other
goal is at stake. Thus, in the United States, if a defendant is willing
and the court approves, the state will often permit a defendant to
plead to a lesser charge and save the state the time and expense of a
trial. Similarly, a criminal defendant might be permitted to plead
guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for information and testimony
that would permit the authorities to arrest other, presumably more
"dangerous," criminals. Thus, society is willing at times to sacrifice
perfect utilitarian or retributive justice if a higher common good is
served by the compromise. Society accepts compromises on criminal
punishment as long as widely held norms of justice are not violated.
By punishing the guilty and not punishing the innocent, a soci-
ety's criminal law system reaffirms societal values.228 This adds to the
cohesion of society in most cases. It might even be said that society
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 52-55 (1975) (arguing that other persons do commit
new crimes when the first offender is incapacitated).
226 The idea of rehabilitation is that society will take the offender, provide educa-
tion, and make him or her a better person. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 53 (1968) (calling rehabilitation "[t]he most immediately appeal-
ing justification for punishment"). This, of course, assumes that the offender is capa-
ble of being rehabilitated. At least some criminologists have expressed grave doubts
about the criminal law system's ability to rehabilitate. See WISON, supra note 223, at
162-82. If the person can be rehabilitated, the next question is whether society has
the right (or the obligation) to rehabilitate a person who does not want to be rehabili-
tated. See generally AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 83-99
(1972) (arguing that a corrupt society has no right to rehabilitate a political pris-
oner). We are, after all, rehabilitating the criminal for our benefit, not his or her
benefit. As a practical matter, it has been suggested that many of our prison systems
have exactly the opposite effect, serving instead as schools of crime. WILSON, supra
note 223, at 166-67 (referring to a growing belief among judges that prisons do not
rehabilitate); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
13-18 (1986) (evaluating the evidence and determining that, even where the pro-
grams were well planned and financed, rehabilitation did not seem to work).
227 The retributivist looks at the person who has done the bad act and justifies
punishment by focusing on moral culpability. See EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIO-
NALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 82 (1966) ("The retributivist legislator would, presuma-
bly, want to prohibit and penalize deeds it would be morally wrong to do. But we
have no laws against lying, ingratitude, or lust."); Rychlak, supra note 199, at 325-31.
228 This has been called the denunciation effect or theory of criminal punishment.
Rychlak, supra note 199, at 331-37. The authors would like to thank Avery Cardinal
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owes an obligation to the citizens to usually punish those who have
committed bad acts. 229 There are cases, however, where punishment
of even a clearly guilty person might not promote societal cohesion.
At these times, prosecutorial discretion, executive clemency, amnesty,
and even jury nullification can do more to serve the common good
than would punishment of the guilty. In such cases, members of the
society are willing to trade the benefit that they might receive from
such punishment for the common good.
Perhaps the most significant problem with the ICC is that it lacks
a meaningful political check on its power. 230 Political negotiations are
essential to building a nation where the rule of law can be established
and human rights can be respected. Those who argue that criminal
prosecutions are alone sufficient to build such a society ignore real-
world politics at the peril of further bloodshed, and forget the un-
happy experiences with prosecutors freed from normal political
processes. 231 Furthermore, because the complementarity provisions
of the Rome Statute are essentially an international "supremacy
clause,"23 2 the ICC would not only make its decisions in a political
vacuum, but it also could negate political efforts for reconciliation
made by national or local polities. To shunt aside in every case the
local statesmanship of a future Nelson Mandela in favor of criminal
trials in The Hague is to reject what may well be the most effective
Dulles for suggesting that, since punishment in this case actually re-affirms societal
value, "reaffirmation" is a more accurate term. We agree.
229 SeeJOHN LoCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 97 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1998) (1690) ("[E]very man, by consenting with others to make
one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every
one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the majority .... );JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 225, at 180, 182
("[E]very one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and
the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest.").
230 Having raised this issue in discussions with several supporters of the ICC as
presently contemplated, the authors have received a consistent reply-the political
check will naturally flow from the quality of people who will become judges, prosecu-
tors, registrars, and other officeholders of the ICC. In other words, because the very
best people will be running the ICC, worry about abuses of the court's jurisdiction is
merely "crying wolf." History seems to contradict this faith in the "best and brightest,"
and we remain unconvinced.
231 In the United States, both major political parties have complained about "inde-
pendent prosecutors" at various times.
232 The authors thank Professor Richard G. Wilkins at Brigham Young University,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, for this term to describe the practical effect of
complementarity.
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path to peace in any given case. 23 3 Former U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger recently noted precisely this flaw in the ICC's
structure:
The advocates of universal jurisdiction argue that the state is the
basic cause of war and cannot be trusted to deliver justice. If law
replaced politics, peace and justice would prevail. But even a cur-
sory examination of history shows that there is no evidence to sup-
port such a theory. The role of the statesman is to choose the best
option when seeking to advance peace and justice, realizing that
there is frequently a tension between the two and that any reconcili-
ation is likely to be partial. 234
The solution to this problem is to tie the exercise of the ICC's
jurisdiction to a political decision by an appropriate international
body, preferably one which is representative of the international body
233 See Davenport, supra note 22, at 18 ("This policy or political use of the ICC as a
kind of substitute for the United Nations, the Security Council, and other forms of
international relations and diplomacy is most disturbing.").
234 Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AlT., July-Aug.
2001, at 86, 95. In a response to Mr. Kissinger's concerns, Kenneth Roth, the Execu-
tive Director of Human Rights Watch and a supporter of the ICC, stated:
Kissinger would have had a better case had prosecutors sought, for example,
to overturn the compromise negotiated by South Africa's Nelson Mandela,
widely recognized at the time as the legitimate representative of the victims
of apartheid. Mandela agreed to grant abusers immunity from prosecution
if they gave detailed testimony about their crimes. In an appropriate exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion, no prosecutor has challenged this arrange-
ment, and no government would likely countenance such a challenge.
Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 150,
153.
These comments, however, reveal the danger of an ICC with sole discretion over
the exercise of universal jurisdiction in a way surely unintended by Mr. Roth. First,
prosecutorial discretion is lauded in the South Africa case because Mandela was
"widely recognized" as a "legitimate representative" of victims. Presumably, the wide
recognition of Mandela's legitimacy is not simply a recognition by the citizens of
South Africa, but rather the amorphous international "civil society" of intellectuals
and nongovernmental organizations. Surely, however, the bona fides of the broker
are less important than the substance of the settlement. One wonders if there might
be cases where the ICC might wrongly exercise jurisdiction because distaste for the
brokers of peace blinds the international community to the benefits of a political
settlement.
Second, in putting his faith in "appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion,"
Roth reveals a variation of the argument that only the best people will run the ICC,
and they can be trusted to do the "right thing." See supra note 230. However, as the
U.S. experience with independent prosecutors demonstrates (and Mr. Kissinger
points out in his article), a prosecutor bound only by his or her own prudential judg-
ment, without meaningful political checks, can be highly problematic.
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politic. There is no such body in the world today, and there may
never be. 235 As the example of ad hoc human rights tribunals demon-
strates, however, it is possible for the international community to
unite behind prosecutions in appropriate cases, after frank political
deliberations. Indeed, even without an ICC, a potential tyrant would
be foolhardy to assume that he could commit gross violations of
human rights with impunity, though this fact nonetheless seems to be
precious little deterrent to the modern tyrant.236
The international body best equipped to perform the political
calculus in such cases is the United Nations Security Council, 237 and it
is no surprise that Henry Kissinger proposes that the Security Council
establish an advisory organ or subcommittee to advise it regarding
prosecutions for any systematic and gross violations of human
rights. 238 The Security Council, having decided that prosecution is
appropriate, could define the scope of the prosecutions and refer the
case to a body such as the ICC.23 9 The prosecutor then could exercise
discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute after an appropri-
ate criminal investigation.
In such a scheme, the ICC might still be a standing international
court, whose structure would be in place waiting for its jurisdiction to
be invoked. 240 By relying on the United Nations Security Council, the
235 See supra notes 166-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility
of an international body politic and its importance in making decisions regarding, for
want of a better phrase, the international common good.
236 The primary raison d'etre for the ICC is to deter future tyrants. It seems un-
likely to us, however, that the ICC will be an effective deterrent at all. Observers of
popular social sciences argue that certainty of punishment, not severity of punish-
ment, is the key to effective deterrence. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 223, at 117-21.
Certainty of punishment from a practical standpoint is not attainable, particularly
when the wrongdoer is a national leader supported by military power. Accordingly, if
deterrence is dependant on both factors, increasing the penalty is the more efficient
way to deter crime. See Rychlak, supra note 199, at 310. The ICC, however, does not
have authority to impose the death penalty. One might wonder whether a court that
offers due process, legal advice, and no death penalty might actually decrease the fear
(and hence deterrence) of a dictator who had feared the fate left to Mussolini or
others.
237 From the early days of the Security Council, it was recognized by some observ-
ers as "the peace and law enforcer." Adama Dieng, International CriminalJustice: From
Paper to Practice-A Contribution from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 688, 691 (2002).
238 Kissinger, supra note 234, at 95-96; see also Davenport, supra note 22, at 13
(suggesting a proposal similar to Kissinger's).
239 See Kissinger, supra note 234, at 95-96. Mr. Kissinger seems to have in mind a
system of purely ad hoc tribunals, rather than a permanent court.
240 By having a standing set of procedures and established legal definitions, this
option would put people on notice, thereby eliminating most due process concerns
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one international organ that history demonstrates is best (though far
from perfectly) capable of making decisions to foster the international
common good, 24 1 the potential for the ICC to do more harm than
good would be reduced greatly. Moreover, it is quite likely that, with-
out such a political component, major nations will notjoin the Court
or will refuse to comply with their obligations as signatories when and
if the Court acts too aggressively in pursuing prosecutions-thus ren-
dering the ICC impotent.
B. Susidiarity, Not Complementarity
The second, related flaw in the Rome Statute has to do with the
doctrine of complementarity.242 As discussed earlier, the ICC will not
take a case unless the affected nation is unable or unwilling to prose-
cute the wrongdoer, but the ICC itself will be the sole arbiter of
whether a nation is unable or unwilling to prosecute potential defend-
ants-even if there has been a judicial or some other type of proceed-
ing.24 3 Moreover, the ICC does not have to recognize amnesties
and providing a level of deterrence against tyranny; it would also eliminate any ques-
tion about "victor's justice." The Nuremberg tribunals have been criticized because
the defendants did not have such notice. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
241 Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch applauded the decision of the Rome
Conference to reject a similar proposal "because it would allow the council's five per-
manent members, including Russia and China as well as the United States, to exempt
their nationals and those of their allies by exercising their vetoes." Roth, supra note
234, at 154. Roth is correct about the imperfect nature of politics. Without such a
political check, however, proponents of the court reject the possibility of any solution
other than universal criminal jurisdiction in what will sometimes be complicated crim-
inal and political questions. Moreover, the experience of the ad hoc tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia demonstrates that it is possible for the Security Council to approve
the prosecution of individuals, such as Serbs, who are members of nations or ethnic
groups that are, or have been, allied politically and tied through culture to perma-
nent members of the Security Council. It is peculiar that supporters of the ICC place
little or no faith in the political decisionmaking of the Security Council, but seemingly
place enormous faith in the ability of prosecutors and judges to make the same pru-
dential judgments correctly.
242 For a discussion of the origin and meaning of the doctrine of "complementar-
ity," see supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text
243 Obviously we agree that complementarity, with the preference for national tri-
als over trials at the ICC, is better than a system where the preference goes the other
way. Some colleagues have noted that the preference was for the international tribu-
nals in the Rwanda situation, and complementarity should be hailed for having
changed that. In fact, however, the Rwanda decision was based on the facts of that
particular situation. National courts were not in a position to hold these trials.
Whether the Rwanda trials were based on complementarity or subsidiarity, it is likely
that all trials would have taken place in the international tribunals. We do not see this
as a valid criticism of our argument.
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granted by nations, even if they are part of a negotiated and delicately
balanced political settlement. Simply put, the decision of whether to
ignore proceedings or settlements at the national level resides solely
with the ICC itself under the Rome Statute. The Statute contains no
principles or guidelines for the exercise of this discretion (and no ap-
pellate process). Indeed, despite the assurances of some to the con-
trary,244 the Rome Statute seems to require prosecution regardless of
national preferences. There is an alternative. The principle of sub-
sidiarity teaches:
[I]t is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance
of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what
lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activ-
ity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the
body social, and never destroy and absorb them.
24 5
The most fundamental facet of the theory is that it is gravely
wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own
initiative and industry and give it to the community. 2 4 6 Subsidiarity
recognizes that the individual will not always be able to do for himself,
but where that is true, the individual should be assisted by an interme-
diate association, such as a family, church, school, or union. Impor-
tantly, assistance should come from the intermediate association
244 The comments of Mr. Kenneth Roth seem to imply that prosecutions would be
inappropriate, and would not occur, in a situation akin to South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. See supra note 150. Even if there is "room" for pruden-
tial judgment to be exercised in applying the complementarity provision of the Rome
Statute, the question remains whether and how the ICC should be the body to make
the decision.
245 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO [ON RECONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL ORDER],
79 (1931), reprinted in CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC SociAL TEACHING 47 (Nat'l Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Conference ed., 1991). See CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 1883-1885 (2d ed. 2000) (describing Catholic Church doctrine
on subsidiarity). Professor Finnis characterizes subsidiarity as "one important devel-
opment of the Aristotelian political science, drawing on but going well beyond Aris-
totle's critique of Plato's communism." FINNIS, supra note 165, at 159. Unlike
complementarity, subsidiaity is a moral fight. Id. ("Being a matter of right (justice),
not merely efficiency, it is obviously closely related to what many people refer to as the
right to liberty."); see also Rychlak & Czarnetzky, supra note 5, at 138 (discussing the
potential role of subsidiarity in the ICC); Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of
Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001) (tracing the roots of sub-
sidiarity and analyzing its past and prospective application in European Union law,
federalism in the United States, and as a general governing principle).
246 ZIEGLER, supra note 52, at 139 (noting that this was one reason why the
Norwegians rejected membership in the European Union in 1972).
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closest to the problem, with less involved and more detached associa-
tions only used when absolutely necessary. 247
Subsidiarity has been characterized as "neither a theological nor
even really a philosophical principle, but a piece of congealed histori-
cal wisdom." 248 By focusing explicitly on the common good, sub-
sidiarity would require a more nuanced, comprehensive, and political
determination by the prosecutor and the Court before it assumes ju-
risdiction. Of course, this is precisely the type of reasoning that is
better left to political bodies, who are far better equipped than
courts.
2 4 9
Subsidiarity is closely related to Aristotle's concept of justice as
friendship. 2 50 Jim Towey, director of Faith-Based and Community Ini-
tiatives in the George W. Bush Administration, defined subsidiarity in
the political sense as follows:
It's the human principle of contact. It was my experience in dealing
with people in soup kitchens and in our AIDS shelter that they were
thirsting for someone to know them by name, to care about their
life story, to care if they woke up the next morning, simple things
like that. And government can't do that. President Bush says this
all the time, "Government cannot love." It's very hard for govern-
ment to be a neighbor. 25k
247 Stated this way, the doctrine of complementarity seems to embody the spirit of
subsidiarity. That is not precisely the case, however. For one thing, the delegates in
Rome expressly rejected subsidiarity and instead invented this new legal doctrine of
complementarity. There must be a reason for that. We have previously argued that
subsidiarity would provide a moral basis for favoring national sovereignty, whereas
complementarity offers merely a political one. The practical result in these early
years might be negligible or even non-existent. In the long run, however, pressure
will mount for the international court to assume greaterjurisdiction, and complemen-
tarity will offer no logical basis to resist that pressure, whereas subsidiarity would offer
a logical, moral basis for resisting such expansion. Rychlack & Czarnetzky, supra note
5, at 132-38.
248 John Coleman, S.J., Development of Church Social Teaching, in READINGS IN MORAL
THEOLOGY No. 5: OFFICIAL CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 169, 183 (Charles E. Curran &
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., 1986).
249 See LAw AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 202, at 239-49; DIGNITY OF LEGISLA-
TION, supra note 202, at 3-6. This is reflected in the common pairing of subsidiarity
with the doctrine of solidarity.
250 See supra notes 172-88 and accompanying text; see also LAW AND DISAGREEMENT,
supra note 202, at 137 (noting that communicating experiences and insights to
others, which complement or qualify those that the other already possesses, "enables
the group as a whole to attain a degree of wisdom and practical knowledge that sur-
passes even that of the most excellent individual member").
251 Crisis Interview with Jim Towey, CRISIS, June 2002, at 40, 43 (defining
subsidiarity).
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It would even be harder for an international organization to be a
neighbor.
The doctrine of subsidiarity already is found in modern interna-
tional agreements. The Maastricht Treaty adopts the subsidiarity prin-
ciple without detracting from the primacy of the Treaty on European
Union.25 2 In fact, subsidiarity lies at the core of the European Com-
munity's Social Charter, and it stands as a maxim for arranging the
order of all types of social institutions within the Community, includ-
ing the delimitation of competencies between the European Commu-
nities and the Member States. 253 When the drafters of the Rome
Statute bypassed this well-established doctrine and invented a totally
new one, they took away the moral preference in favor of flexible,
local decisions and replaced it with a rigid, legalistic approach that
will operate from a remote, international organization.
Complementarity as defined in the Rome Statute is couched in
absolute terms-a nation must investigate and prosecute, or the ICC
will step in and do the job. Complementarity seems to be based on
nothing more than a legal norm-that the ICC will be the institution
that enforces human rights norms embodied in the Rome Statute, re-
gardless of the consequences. Seen this way, complementarity shifts
power to international institutions at the expense of nation states and
their polities.
Subsidiarity, on the other hand, is based on the idea of service
from the larger body to the smaller. By focusing on an inquiry into
the common good of the nation and, therefore, the actual human
beings involved, the calculus of whether to assert jurisdiction in a par-
ticular case is not mechanically foreordained. In circumstances simi-
lar to post-World War II Germany, the decision to prosecute Nazi
officials in an international tribunal undoubtedly would be the same
regardless of whether complementarity or subsidiarity was the "rule of
decision" regarding international jurisdiction. In situations like the
transitional societies in South Africa and Chile, however, subsidiarity
would seem to lead to a different result than would complementarity.
Few would disagree with the argument that the South African ex-
perience, in ridding itself of apartheid and making the transition to
252 TREATv ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224/1) 191 (1992).
253 See id. art. 3(b) (stating that the principle of subsidiarity provides that when the
EU does not have exclusive jurisdiction, the EU will act only if the Member States
cannot achieve the objectives of the proposed action); see also Larry Catd Backer, Har-
monization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition
Within Federative and International Legal Systems, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 185, 211
(1997) (stating that the interests of the supranational unit prevail when the interests
of member states conflict).
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democracy without bloodshed, was the best course of action for that
nation. South Africa's unique colonial experience; its racial, cultural,
and economic diversity and vitality; the history of apartheid; the char-
acter of leaders such as Nelson Mandela; and many other factors, com-
bined with a commitment by all parties acting in their own self
interest to a political process, ultimately yielded a peaceful transition
to democracy. This transition included a decision to have a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission rather than a purely legalistic mechanism
to achieve justice. A proper application of the doctrine of subsidiarity
in these circumstances would affirm a decision by an international
court not to intervene; that is, to let the nation sort the matter out for
itself. Complementarity, however, could easily lead to a different
result.
Post-Pinochet Chile also presents an illustrative case. There was
no justice in this process for the victims or their families; however, the
common good was well served by the political settlement. One need
not be an apologist for bloody tyrants to see the advantages of letting
the local polity construct its own path to democracy. At a minimum,
the decision of an international tribunal to intervene in such circum-
stance should be based upon a comprehensive review of the local con-
ditions, and the delineation of tangible advantages of prosecution
over local solutions. That is precisely what is required under the doc-
trine of subsidiarity. Complementarity, on the other hand, would
mandate prosecution of the tyrants, regardless of any amnesty laws
and with no regard for the good of the nation's body politic.
The doctrine of complementarity as set forth in the Rome Statute
absolves the ICC prosecutor and court of any requirement to consider
the common good. Indeed, one might argue that it would be a viola-
tion of the Rome Statute for the prosecutor to do so. This is an intol-
erable situation. The minimum cure, assuming no effective political
body to check the ICC (and perhaps even if there were one), would
be for the Court itself to adopt subsidiarity explicitly, and for the
Rome Statute to be amended to reflect this change. 254
C. Change the Court's Structure
More than a "statute" and a court are necessary for the interna-
tional community to effectively foster the goals that are embodied in
human rights norms without making some horrible situations worse.
254 To effectuate this change immediately, the Court would have to ignore legisla-
tive history and interpret complementarity to be equivalent to subsidiarity, as the
Rome Statute by its own terms may not be amended for the first seven years of the
Court's existence. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 121, 37 I.L.M. at 1067. -
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There are at least three additional, fundamental requirements. First,
in order to be legitimate, any statute or body of international criminal
law must emerge from the international body politic. Though the
world is very far indeed from being integrated enough politically to be
considered one "community" in the sense that we have been discuss-
ing, at a minimum an institution such as the ICC should emerge from
those institutions that come closest to such a world community. More-
over, the legitimacy of such an institution depends upon it being met
by universal, or near universal, agreement in such a "world commu-
nity," including its most powerful members. Second, there must be a
means for the "world body politic" to control the court. Due to con-
cerns that the Security Council might block prosecution of defendants
from certain nations, the ICC is not under the auspices of the United
Nations. While the concern may have validity, the response in this
case is worse than the problem. The ICC desperately needs some
form of a political check on its authority, and there is none in the
current structure. 255 Third, such a "world body politic" must have a
political process through which the general justice of the world com-
munity might emerge. Presently, the effort is to build a free-standing
international tribunal with worldwide jurisdiction designed without,
and divorced from, any effective international body politic. Far from
recognizing the role of law within a political system, the architects of
the ICC have been seduced by what one commentator has called the
"antipolitical temptation,"256 manifested in this case by an apparent
absolute faith in strict legalism. There is certainly a place for an inter-
national tribunal or tribunals to prosecute gross violations of human
rights, but the ICC as presently constituted seems doomed to fail.
We would suggest a change to the structure of the Court that
would make it less likely to exercise its jurisdiction in all but the most
clearly appropriate circumstances. For example, rather than a stand-
ing court with its own permanent bureaucracy, the ICC could be re-
255 The Assembly of States Parties is the organization that has administrative over-
sight of the court. Perhaps it might one day emerge as such a body, but it is now so
closely linked with the ICC itself that it seems hardly reasonable to consider it a sepa-
rate body. Moreover, it is open (in terms of voting authority) only to those nations
that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute.
256 Damon Linker, The Antipolitical Temptation, FIRST THINGS, June-July 2002, at
10-11.
Just as communism was supposed to redeem us from politics and wound up
producing an unprecedented tyranny, so today's prophets of global humani-
tarianism would trick us into believing that [through the ICC] we can
bureaucratize our way out of the human condition. And once again the
results are liable to be pernicious.
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vised into something of a skeletal institution to be mobilized only in
instances analogous to those where there have been ad hoc tribunals
in the past.2 57 International laws and procedures could be adopted,
but they would only be mobilized when a specific case was ready to be
tried. This would put putative defendants on notice, eliminate the
claim of "victor's justice," and also reduce the likelihood that the
court's jurisdiction will significantly expand.
With the currently contemplated standing Court of eighteen
judges and full support staff, it is quite likely that the Court will ex-
pand its jurisdiction. Most ICC crimes will not be prosecuted until the
regime in question has been ousted. As such, cases may be prepared,
but trials are unlikely to happen any time soon. 258 In such a situation,
sitting judges and related administrators may feel the need to justify
their operational budget. In other words, they might begin looking
around for cases to prosecute. A shell organization would be far less
likely to be influenced by such pressure.
A second structural reform would be to require that, in any given
prosecution, the judges sitting on the case be composed of one-half
ICCjudges and one-halfjudges from the nation or nations implicated
in the case. This would be a minimal attempt to bring an understand-
ing of local circumstances to proceedings at the seat of the ICC in The
Hague, which will often be quite far removed from the site of the
crimes being prosecuted. Having local judges participate in the pro-
ceedings would enhance the credibility of the international tribunal,
and perhaps would bring an important perspective to decisions from
culpability through sentencing. Such a solution might blunt some of
the potential harm from the ICC usurping local political and judicial
processes.
CONCLUSION
The quest to end impunity in human affairs and to punish those
who commit gross violations of human rights is a noble cause that will,
hopefully, one day bear fruit. History teaches, however, that the devil
can dwell in the details of the most nobly intended institutions. The
ICC, as it was designed in the Rome Statute, is a flawed institution that
contains the seeds of the Court's eventual desuetude, or worse, of
causing greater harm than the crimes it was intended to redress. We
have focused on those flaws, giving concrete examples of how to im-
257 Given the tendency for bureaucracies to become entrenched and self-perpetu-
ating, it may be too late for this suggestion to be practical.
258 After all, in all of recorded history there have been only four similar cases ever
tried. See supra note 4.
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prove the Court, in the hope that the ideals that led to the Rome Stat-
ute will not blind the international community to the grave flaws in
the instrument designed to give those ideals substance.
An effective international tribunal, one that will do most of the
good that its proponents posit for the ICC, cannot rest upon an unbri-
dled faith in legalism. With the ICC, however, the yearning for an end
to human rights abuses has led a significant portion of the interna-
tional community to look only toward mechanistic legalism, enforced
by an unaccountable Court. In doing this, the ICC is essentially im-
posing the "unconditional surrender" model of Nuremberg on all fu-
ture transitional societies. No room is left for political compromise. 259
This, of course, means that the ICC is taking some potential tools for
peace off of the table. That is a dangerous thing to do.
Law itself is an instrument of politics, and therefore does not
transcend human beings and our foibles. Though it is unfashionable
to assert, humans have no choice but politics when we discuss just
resolutions of difficult situations. Put differently, the fallible human
beings who will run the ICC, though garbed in the mantle of positive
law derived from noble human-rights norms, will still just be human
beings. If history teaches anything, it is that human beings with un-
checked, absolute power will eventually abuse that power. In the case
of an international tribunal with the power decisively to affect the fu-
ture of entire peoples, the stakes are far too high to deny such a truth
learned through so much hardship over the centuries.
259 Psychologist Abraham Maslow said: "People who are only good with hammers
see every problem as a nail." GLENN VAN EKEREN, SPEAKER'S SOURCEBOOK II: QUOTES,
STORIES & ANECDOTES FOR EVERY OCCASION 304 (1994) (quoting Abraham Maslow).
By offering only one "tool" for peace, the ICC will have the effect of having all
problems handled the same way. That strikes us as an unwise approach to world
peace.
[VOL. 79:1
